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SHARE REPURCHASES UNDER MODERN
CORPORATION LAWS
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
4THE public be damned!" This picturesque expression exemplified
the business philosophy of the late nineteenth century. Part of
this same credo was an attitude of caveat emptor for the shareholders of
corporations and a similar callousness towards company creditors. The
reaction to this "rugged-individualist" position, characteristic of the
"robber-barons," as some American industrial leaders were later termed
when the extent of their profits through corporate manipulations became
known, resulted in the passage of several repressive laws designed to
protect the gullible public against the depredations of these clever opera-
tors and their skillful attorneys.
One may argue that the nation's welfare is better served by favoring
the clever at the expense of public folly, and perhaps the recent centennial
anniversary of the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species,' with
its doctrine of survival of the fittest, makes this an appropriate time for
such an argument. Consonant with Darwin's thinking, the modem
attitude toward corporation laws is a "permissive" one: corporations
should in most instances be free to do as they want so long as those
dealing with them have a fair opportunity to ascertain the risks involved
therein, and can thus act accordingly.
If the public declines, or neglects, to read a prospectus or the fine
print on the back of a stock certificate, or, perhaps, even the corporate
charter, it does not seem unfair to hold them to the investment risks
tacitly accepted from the constructive notice thus given. The rule of
constructive notice is, after all, merely a necessary consequence of the
presumption of the basically equivalent rationality of all men.
Corporation laws need not, then, bend over backwards to protect
those "who have only themselves to blame." However, the choice of an
individualistic, as opposed to a paternalistic, system of social organiza-
tion would certainly appear to be one which should be consciously made.
It is submitted that often these value judgments, the primary legislative
function, have been undertaken without any appreciation of the under-
lying policy considerations involved, and perhaps, even devoid of any
realization that basic value choices were indeed being made.
Thus it is that many corporation statutes, drafted in an era still
inundated by the public reaction to corporate "excesses" bridging the
turn of the century, while possessing indicia of a protective rigidity still
-* Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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allow an enormous scope for the grossest imposition upon both creditors
and shareholders. Failure to take advantage of these "loopholes" seems
explicable only in terms of a supererogatory conscientiousness on the
part of corporate directors, or lack of imaginative legal advice.
A glaring example is provided by recent statutory provisions concern-
ing the right of a corporation to purchase its own shares. Of the fifty-
two American jurisdictions (the fifty states plus the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico), all but ten' grant express statutory authorization for
the exercise of the power, and even in the corporation laws of most of
the latter, the existence of the privilege is made clear enough. Further,
the absence of express authorization is no indication of a lack of cor-
poration power. New York, the second largest corporation state, recog-
nizes the right, although its clearest grant of the power is in a negative
statute making it a misdemeanor for directors to purchase shares for
their corporation from other than surplus, and apparently allows such
purchases from any kind of surplus (hence, even one created by a mere
writeup of asset value).3
The power may thus even be broader in these semi-silent jurisdictions
than in those with express statutory authorization. The Massachusetts
courts4 have utilized statutory sketchiness to evolve one of the broadest
rules in the country as to the scope of the power, permitting general
purchases to be made from capital.
Those jurisdictions which have recently5 revised their corporation
laws, e.g., Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa,
2. Only Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, South Carolina, and Wyoming fail to grant express general permission to
corporations to repurchase their own shares.
3. New York expressly makes provision only for purchases out of capital. It allows
these in two instances (both of which are also permitted by the Model Act): the purchase
or redemption of redeemable shares (N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 28) and the reacquisitlon of
shares entitled to appraisal (N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 21). It makes the general power to
repurchase dear, however, albeit negatively, from its prohibition (making directors guilty of
a misdemeanor for violation) of all purchases other than from surplus. N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 664. Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942), construed this "surplus"
available for dividends to include an unrealized appreciation in the value of fixed assets.
See also Ballantine, Corporations 541 (rev. ed. 1946).
4. Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935); Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 607.
5. The term "modern corporation statutes" can only properly be used to refer to
significantly revised statutes and not to mere codifications (or reallocations) of existing
law. A number of states other than those included have "new" corporation laws, but only
in the latter sense. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, effective Jan. 9, 1956; Hawaii
Rev. Laws ch. 172 (1955), effective Mar. 18, 1957; La. Rev. Stat. tit. 12 (1950), effective
Apr. 1, 1950; Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 7, ch. 78 (1957), effective Jan. 25, 1957, all of which
represent largely a recodification of pre-existing law. See note 12 infra as to the specific use
herein of the term "modern corporation statute."
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Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin, all' expressly allow a corporation to
purchase its own shares.7 Most allow such purchases to be made, in
certain instances, even out of capital.8
While statutory provisions may differ, it is fair to say that none has
been drawn up in ignorance of,9 and most have indeed been influenced
by, section 5 of the so-called Model Business Corporation Act, the
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association's pro-
6. All of these jurisdictions have enacted new corporation laws since 1950. Sea Alaska
Comp. Laws Ann. ch. 36-2A (Supp. 1958); Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32; D.C. Code Ann.
tit. 29 (Supp. 1959); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 603 (1956); Iowa Code ch. 321 (1959); Md. Ann.
Code art. 23 (1951); N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 55 (Supp. 1959); NJ). Rev. Code ch. 10-19
(Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 1701 (Page Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. ch. 57
(1959); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14 (Supp. 1957); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2 (1956); Va. Code
Ann. tit. 13 (Supp. 1958); Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 23 (1957). See also notes 11-12.
7. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-9Da
(Supp. 1959); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.13(9)(b) (1956); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-202 (1943);
Iowa Code ch. 321, § 5 (1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52 (Supp. 1959); NJ). Rev. Code §
10-1905 (Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.35 (Page Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 57.035 (1959); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 1510 (Supp. 1957); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art.
2.03 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-4 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 1SO03U5 (1957).
8. The only exception is the Florida statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 603.13(9)(b) (1956),
which only allows purchases out of "surplus of its assets over its liabilities including capi-
tal," and the Puerto Rico law, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 1510 (Supp. 1957), which forbids
such purchases when they "would cause any impairment of the capital of the corporation."
All of the others (with the exception of Virginia which allows such purchases in three of
the four) at least allow purchases from capital in the four situations where such purchases
are permitted by the Model Act. Two statutes even go further. Wisconsin allows
acquisition from capital with 2/3 shareholder approval (of shares of equal and prior
rank), where the liquidation rights of preferred shareholders are protected, provided
equity insolvency (defined, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.02 (1957)) is not present and would not
result therefrom. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 1S0.35 (1957). Ohio similarly allows any purchases from
capital with 2/3 shareholder (all classes) approval (or a lesser percentage down to majority,
if the articles so provide). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 170135(A)(9) (Page Supp. 1959).
Quaere: if even the insolvency test is applicable. (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.35(B)
(Page Supp. 1959) and Committee's comment).
9. Whitney Campbell, writing in 1956 before some of the most recent statutes were
passed, assessed the Model Act's influence on the preceding new statutes by the following
percentages of derivation: D.C., 90%; Oregon, 95l%; Texas, 35%; Virginia, 951; Wis-
consin, 90%. Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 Bus. Law. 93 (1956).
Although he claims that the Ohio statute was not used as a basis for the Model Act, the
comprehensive nature of the study made by the Ohio Committee would itself indicate at
least familiarity with, if not influence by, the earlier (1953) revision of the Model Act. Id.
at 101. Campbell adds that although the North Carolina statute purports to be influenced
by the Model Act, it is "such a poor job" that the Model Act drafters de.re no credit
for it. Id. at 109. (As will be suggested below, the North Carolina statute, nonethele.s,
possesses certain virtues over the former with regard to the provision on share repurchases.)
The statutes of Alaska, Colorado and North Dakota, enacted after Campbell's article,
are also clearly patterned after the Model Act.
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posed paradigm for the nation's corporation statutes. In fact, many are
substantially identical to the Model Act section. 10 Since the Model Act
provision has already had such influence, and appears certain to have
an even greater one on the nation's corporation laws," it is fair to
consider it as typical of the modern American law on share acquisition. 2
I. THE MODEL ACT
The 1957 revision'3 of section 5 grants a corporation the right to
purchase and deal in its shares out of "unreserved and unrestricted
10. The following jurisdictions allow the same purchases from capital as does the
Model Act: Alaska, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin, and except for repurchase of fractional shares (which are
forbidden to be issued-Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-21 (1950)), Virginia. Likewise, Alaska,
Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin,
in effect, allow the use of any surplus for purchases of shares. (The District of Columbia is
an exception, permitting only the use of earned surplus for all but the special Model Act
capital purchases.) Similarly, all, except Alaska, which by following the earlier (1953)
Model Act provision seems to permit extraordinary capital purchases to be made even
though the insolvency test is not met, at least forbid such purchases if equity insolvency is
present or would result from such repurchases.
11. E.g., the Iowa legislature recently passed the Model Bus. Corp. Act. Iowa Laws
1959, H.F. 368, effective July 4, 1959. New York, the second largest corporation state,
which is presently undertaking a revision of its corporation laws, is also using the Model
Act as a framework for its research. Joint N.Y. Legisl. Comm. to Study Revision of Corp.
Laws, Legisl. Doc. No. 17, at 96 (1957). See also Legisl. Doc. No. 23, at 31, 66, 97 (1958).
12. The recent statutes of Alaska, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin have all been significantly influenced by the Model
Act. Henceforth, when the term "modern corporation statutes" is used herein, it is meant
to refer to the laws of these jurisdictions, unless the context otherwise indicates.
The share repurchase sections of these statutes are as follows: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann,
§ 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-904a (Supp. 1959); Md. Ann. Code art.
23, § 32 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52 (Supp. 1959); N.D. Bus. Corp. Act § 5 (1957);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.035 (1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03 (1956); Va. Code Ann. §
13.1-4 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180-385 (1957). Although in 1958 Colorado enacted the
Model Act, including § 5 (Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32, § 5), this section was recently amended
to forbid a corporation to repurchase its own shares except out of unreserved and un-
restricted surplus. L. 1959, S.B. 216, § 5(1), effective May 18, 1959. With regard to share
repurchases, then, Colorado is no longer a typical Model Act state.
Although the Florida, Ohio and Puerto Rican statutes all qualify temporarily as modern
revisions, they appear to have been less influenced by the Model Act, at least in their share
repurchase provisions, and are, therefore, not herein castigated with the characterization
"modern corporation statutes" unless the context indicates otherwise.
13. The A.B.A. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 5 (rev. 1953), as subsequently revised in 1957,
provides:
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, hold,
own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchases of its own
shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of unreserved and unre-
stricted earned surplus available therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so permit
or with the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of all shares entitled to
vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor.
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earned surplus," or if the certificate so provides,'14 or two-thirds of the
shareholders having voting rights approve, out of its "unreserved and
unrestricted capital surplus"' 5 as well.
To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used as the measure of the
corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as
such shares are held as treasury shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of any
such shares the restriction shall be removed pro tanto.
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may purchase or otherwise
acquire its own shares for the purpose of:
(a) Eliminating fractional shares.
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation.
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares under the
provisions of this Act.
(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this Act, the retirement of its re-
deemable shares by redemption or by purchase at not to exceed the redemption
price.
No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent.
This 1957 revision of § S was apparently designed to make it dearer that purchases from
capital were to be forbidden when equity insolvency was present or would result, and,
also, presumably to meet the problem raised by contracts to repurchase.
14. As most certificates will undoubtedly provide, since it is the custom of lawyers to
make corporate powers as broad as the law permits. See Pantzer & O'Neil, The Drafting
of Corporate Charters and By-Laws 29-32 (1951).
15. Although these terms are nowhere expressly defined in the Model Act, the purpose
is to prevent the re-use of such surplus for any other repurchases until the shares are
cancelled. See A.B.A. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 5, comment (rev. 1953). Strange as it may
seem, the surplus might otherwise be used over and over again to make share purchases.
This is true because reacquired shares may reduce pro tanto the liability side of the balance
sheet, hence leaving the surplus constant. Nemmers, The Power of a Corporation to
Purchase Its Own Stock, 17 Vis. L. Rev. 161, 184 n.129 (1942), illustrates this deceptive
accounting practice used by some corporations with a simplified balance sheet:
Before purchase:
Cash $100,000 Capital Stock $ 90.00
Surplus 10,000
$100,000
$100,000
After purchase of $10,000 stock at par with cash:
Cash $ 90,000 Capital Stock $ 80,O0
Surplus 10,000
$90,000
$ "000
If the stock is bought below par there will even be an increase in the surplus if this
accounting method is permitted! The Model Act restriction is dearly wise, therefore.
However, it should be noted that the came result as that shown above can still be
achieved under the Model Act, by simply retiring the stock purchased, instead of keeping
it in the "treasury." The corporate asset fund may thus, like sand, trickle out of the
hands of creditors into the pockets of the shareholders. See also Ballantine, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 627-31 (especially at 631). Presumably, under the Model Act, since acquisition
of treasury shares does not reduce stated capital (§§ 2(b), 2(j)), although the asset side is
reduced (treasury shares are not an asset, § 2(i)), the balance sheet, until formal action
was taken to retire the treasury shares, would be as follows after such a repurchase:
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In addition, under the Model Act, a corporation may also purchase or
redeem its shares out of "stated capital"'" to eliminate fractional shares,
Assets Liabilities
Stated Capital:
Cash $90,000 Outstanding shares $80,000
Treasury Shares 10,000
Surplus (Unrestricted)
Surplus (Restricted) 10,000
$90,000
Any other share repurchase would presumably not be permitted, since effectively out of
stated capital, sed quaere. It is dear, however, that a $10,000 share repurchase would nor-
mally reduce surplus available for dividends and additional share repurchases by $20,000.
(Only, however, until retirement of the shares, after which the (unrestricted) surplus would
again be $10,000. Quaere: if all of this would be capital surplus?) Such a "doubling (of]
the adverse effect" is criticized in Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Buslness
Corporation Act, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1393 (1957). Hackney suggests that the treasury
shares should be carried as an asset. It is submitted that the practice of carrying treasury
shares as an asset is so misleading to the uninitiated that it should never be permitted for
any reason, however cogent. It is further submitted that the double adverse effect Is
desirable in a statutory framework which gives so little other protection to creditors and
shareholders from improvident distributions.
If the treasury shares are not retired but ultimately resold at other than their stated
capital figure, additional problems as to the appropriate surplus account which should be
credited are raised. See Amory and Hardee, Materials On Accounting 323-30 (2d ed. 1953).
The Model Act and modem corporation statutes leave these problems largely unsolved.
16. The Model Act definitions of "stated capital," "surplus," "earned surplus" and
"capital surplus" are a distinct improvement over the previously uncertain usages, and In
line with modem accounting principles. (Compare, however, A.I.A. Research Bull. 39).
Section 2 defines them as follows:
(j) 'Stated capital' means, at any particular time, the sum of (1) the par value of all
shares of the corporation having a par value that have been issued, (2) the amount of the
consideration received by the corporation for all shares of the corporation without par
value that have been issued, except such part of the consideration therefor as may have
been allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (3) such amounts not
included in clauses (1) and (2) of this paragraph as have been transferred to stated capital
of the corporation, whether upon the issue of shares as a share dividend or otherwise, minus
all reductions from such sum as have been effected in a manner permitted by law. Irrespec-
tive of the manner or designation thereof by the laws under which a foreign corporation
is organized, the stated capital of a foreign corporation shall be determined on the same
basis and in the same manner as the stated capital of a domestic corporation, for the pur-
pose of computing fees, franchise taxes and other charges imposed by this Act.
(k) 'Surplus' means the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital.
(1) 'Earned surplus' means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the
balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or
from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application of its capital surplus
or stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders and
transfers to stated capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers
are made out of earned surplus.
(m) 'Capital surplus' means the entire surplus of a corporation other than its earned
surplus.
"Net assets" is defined as:
"(i) 'Net assets' means the amount by which the total assets of a corporation,
excluding treasury shares, exceed the total debts of the corporation."
See generally, Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 478-81.
A corporation's "stated capital," or "capital" in its correct usage, is, therefore, merely the
"answer" obtained by applying a general mathematical formula (the legal "definition") to
the individual corporate variables: This "answer" tells the corporation the amount of
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collect or compromise an indebtedness owed to the corporation, pay
dissenting shareholders the appraisal value of their shares, or retire
(subject to sections 60 and 61,17 and provided no more than the "re-
demption price"'-"call price"-is paid)18 its redeemable shares.
No purchase may be made, however, which would result in insolvency
in the equity (as opposed to bankruptcy) sense. 10
assets which public policy dictates it must keep on hand (or wisely invested) for adequate
protection of its creditors' and shareholders' rights. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 478,
calls capital a limitation' He states that its primary purpose is "to maintain a margin
of net assets in the business over bare solvency or the equivalence of asets and liabilities
as a basis of financial responsibility to creditors, a substitute for the personal liability of
shareholders. The protection of shareholders, preferred and common, is also contemplated."
Id. at 570.
The terms "capital" and "stated capital" are used herein in this sense of a legally pre-
scribed mathematical limitation on corporate distributions.
The Model Act concept of "stated capital" has received widespread statutory approbation.
Modem corporation statutes have either adopted the Model Act definition verbatim or
substantially. See Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-2 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 29-902(j) (Supp. 1959); Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 2 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-47
(Supp. 1959); NJ). Rev. Code §§ 10-1902 (Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.04
(Page Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.035 (Supp. 1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 1-02
(1953); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-2 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 1S0.02 (1957).
17. These sections provide:
§ 60. No redemption or purchase of redeemable shares shall be made by a corporation
when it is insolvent or when such redemption or purchase would render it insolvent, or
which would reduce the net assets below the aggregate amount payable to the holders of
shares having prior or equal rights to the assets of the corporation upon involuntary dis-
solution.
§ 61. When redeemable shares of a corporation are redeemed or purchased by the
corporation, the redemption or purchase shall effect a cancellation of such shares, and a
statement of cancellation shall be filed as provided in this section. Thereupon such shares
shall be restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares, unless the articles of
incorporation provide that such shares when redeemed or purchased shall not be reibued, in
which case the filing of the statement of cancellation shall constitute an amendment to
the articles of incorporation and shall reduce the number of shares of the class so can-
celled which the corporation is authorized to issue by the number of shares so cancelled.
Corresponding restrictions are found in the corporation laws of a number of modern
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 36-2A-73,-79 (Supp. 1958); Colo.
Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32, §§ 62, 63; D.C. Code Ann. § 29-924,-24b (Supp. 1959); Did. Ann.
Code art. 23, §§ 32, 33 (1957); NJ). Bus. Corp. Act §§ 63, 64 (1957); Ore. Rev. StaL
§§ 57.390, .395 (1959) ; Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.09 (1953) ; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-62, -63
(1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.58 (1957).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. "Insolvent" is defined in Model Act § 2(n) as follows:
"'Insolvent' means inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in
the usual course of its business." All modem statutes have such insolvency limitations on
share repurchases. In addition, the modem corporation statutes of Maryland, North Car-
olina and Texas also forbid purchases when bankruptcy insolvency is present or would
result.
Justice Douglas, in Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303 (1945), thus distinguished equity
from bankruptcy insolvency: "[Isolvency in the equity sense has always meant an
inability of the debtor to pay his debts as they mature. Under the Bankruptcy Act it means
an insuffidency of assets at a fair valuation to pay the debts."
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It is submitted that this provision and its statutory adherents are of
the most "rugged-individualist" kind, constituting a danger to unwitting
creditors and shareholders, and therefore legislated, perhaps, without
full appreciation of potential consequences, for a corporation's right
to purchase its own shares "involves a matter of serious import, and is
one with which the public is vitally concerned."20
Since the Model Act is the archetype of modern corporation law
provisions on the subject, its potential dangers warrant analysis in order
that states proposing to enact similar provisions may at least legislate
with complete cognizance of the social implications involved.
II. REASONS FOR SHARE REPURCHASES
It is initially appropriate however to inquire into the reasons for
which a corporation, or, more accurately, its board of directors, may de-
sire the power to purchase its own shares. An English court which led
English law into an unqualified prohibition of such purchases, found no
justifiable reason for the exercise of such a power:
What was the reason which induced the company in the present case to purchase
its shares? If it was that they might sell them again, this would be a trafficking in
the shares, and clearly unauthorized. If it was to retain them, this would be to my
mind an indirect method of reducing the capital of the company. The only suggestion
of another motive (and it seems to me to be a suggestion unsupported by proof) is
that this was intended to be a family company, and that the directors wanted to
keep the shares as much as possible in the hands of those who were partners, or who
were interested in the old firm, or of those persons whom the directors thought they
would like to be amongst this small number of shareholders. . . . No doubt if
certain shareholders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and
are willing to sell their shares, they may be bought out; but this must be done by
persons, existing shareholders, or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares,
and not out of the funds of the company.2'
Nevertheless, boards of directors of American corporations have often
found it desirable to purchase shares for various reasons, and have usu-
ally been supported by the courts.2
See also 1 Collier, Bankruptcy II 1.19, at 89-94 (14th ed. 1956). Bankruptcy insolvency
is characterized by Collier as the "balance sheet test." Id. at 90. He feels that this test
postpones the actual advent of bankruptcy beyond the time when equity insolvency is
present. Id. at 94. It is submitted that Collier is wrong, at least in many instances. See
note 92 infra.
20. Rand, C. J., in Loveland & Co. v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 149 Ore. 58, 78, 39 P.2d
668, 676 (1934).
21. Trevor v. Whitworth, r1887] 12 A.C. 409, 416-17.
22. See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 363, 378 (1958).
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A. Share Repurchases: First Category
1. Redeemable Stock
Redeemable stock is usually regarded by businessmen as a debt which
they are anxious to retire as soon as possible,23 so that corporate profits
may go unrestrictedly to the common stockholders, the real owners of
the corporation. Speedy redemption of such securities, with the con-
sequent freedom from recurrent "interest payments" in the form of
guaranteed (cumulative) dividends is therefore as desirable as the re-
tirement of any other corporate obligation. Often, however, redemption
of a whole class of stock at one time is not economically feasible. Grad-
ual purchases will accomplish the same end, and when made under
favorable market conditions, result in an over-all saving to the corpora-
tion. Purchases of redeemable shares have often been undertaken by
corporations, therefore, and judicially approved. -4
2. Shareholder Indebtedness to a Corporation
Sometimes a person indebted to a corporation is also a shareholder.
In the absence of other assets with which to pay the obligation, it is
certainly better for the corporation to take back stock in settlement of
its claim than to obtain an unenforceable judgment for a higher amount.
This may be so even though the market value of the shares received
may be less than the amount of the debt owed, since the corporation
receives the additional benefit of a release of its dividend obligations to
the debtor-shareholder. Hence corporations have accepted their shares
in compromise of indebtedness, and have been upheld by the courts for
doing so.25
3. Dissenting Stockholders
Dissenting shareholders have at times, unfortunately, been motivated
by the "blackmail value"2 - of their stock votes in their adamant refusal
23. Not, however, by their lawyers, especially when they are attempting (usually suc-
cessfully) to deprive them of accrued dividend and liquidation rights. See, e.g., Langfelder
v. Universal Labs., Inc., 163 F.2d S04 (3d Cir. 1947), and Federal United Corp. v. Havender,
24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
24. See generally, Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 613-21. All of the "modern"
statutes permit such repurchases at call price, even out of capital. See, e.g., Alask Comp.
Laws Ann. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-904a (Supp. 1959); Md. Ann.
Code art. 23, § 32 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52 (Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.035
(Supp. 1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03 (1953); Va. Code Ann. 13.1-4 (1950); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 180.385 (1957). See also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.5 (Page Supp. 1959)
and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 1S03(a) (2) (1957).
25. In fact this type of "repurchase" was one of the earliest recognized in this country
and is even recognized as a permitted exception by the restrictive English rule. See
Nemners, supra note 15, at 163-64, 169.
26. As to the "blackmail" value of minority shares despite appraisal statutes, see
Stevens, Corporations 590 (2d ed. 1949).
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to approve management proposals for significant corporate changes.
Here, too, corporations are anxious to buy out recalcitrants, at a fair
price, and are often actually compelled to do so under so-called ap-
praisal statutes. A corporation's right to pay such dissenting stock-
holders the appraisal value of their shares is thus desirable and has met
with judicial approbation.17
4. Fractional Shares
Often as a result of a stock dividend shareholders become entitled to
fractional shares. For example, if the stock dividend is to be one share
for each 100 held, a holder of only 50 shares is entitled to only 2 share,
and even a holder of 1050 shares will also end up with a fractional share
for that odd 50 he holds. While the problem could be solved by giving
all shareholders an option to take cash in lieu of fractional shares, this
might result in undesirable tax consequences to all shareholders (even
to non-recipients of fractional shares).2 Consequently, issuance of such
fractional shares is frequently indicated. They are, however, a nuisance,
since doubt exists as to their actual status. Do they have half a vote at
stockholders' meetings? Are they entitled to half a share of dividends?
Such questions remain unsolved. While it may be desirable for a cor-
poration to dispose of fractional shares by purchase and resale as units
or by retirement, case law on the power is, however, almost nonexistent.2
All of the above four reasons for a corporation's repurchase of its
shares fall into one class. Under the Model Act, and its "progeny,"
27. Sections 71 and 74 of the Model Act recognize the right of dissenting shareholders
to the appraisal value of their stock on mergers, consolidations and sales or exchanges
(other than in the usual course of business). New York is probably the most generous in
according such rights to dissidents from a number of corporate decisions. N.Y. Stock
Corp. Law § 21 lists the various sections of the New York statute giving rise to an
appraisal right. See also Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 606.
28. Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 305(b)(2), if an election is granted to "any"
shareholder to take cash in lieu of the stock, the distribution becomes immediately taxable
under § 301. "Scrip" is a possible statutory alternative for issuance of such fractional
shares. See Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-21 (1950), which authorizes this as a substitute for the
forbidden fractional shares.
29. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 91 N.Y.S.2d 294, 303 (Sup. Ct. 1949), states that a corporation
has no power to issue such fractional shares without express statutory authority (which is
not given by New York law). The Model Act, however, expressly empowers such issuance
in § 22, and is followed in this grant by all of the modern corporation statutes except
Virginia. See Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-30 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-
908h (Supp. 1959); Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 28 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-58 (Supp.
1959); N.D. Rev. Stat. § 10-1921 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.126 (Supp. 1959);
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.20 (1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.19 (1957). See also Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1701.24(c) (Page Supp. 1959). The Model Act also purports to grant such
shares voting and dividend rights. (§ 22.)
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these purchases may even be made out of capital.30 They are also, in this
respect, extraordinary, since the Model Act generally only permits share
purchases from earned, and under certain circumstances, capital sur-
plus. The drafters of the Model Act apparently felt that these four
categories of purchases were important enough, and sufficiently innoc-
uous, to merit special treatment.
B. Share Repurchases: Second Category
Of course, other reasons may dictate a corporation's repurchase of
its shares. Shareholder subscription agreements sometimes require such
repurchases to be made at the election of the shareholder3 1 A corporation
may utilize these agreements to attract initial capital which might other-
wise be difficult to obtain, and yet is necessary to get the enterprise under
way, or to advertise as a "selling point" the name of the shareholder,
thus stimulating other share subscriptions and credit extensions.
Furthermore, many modern business corporations, realizing that
employee incentive is fostered by giving loyal workers a share of the
profits, have devised plans for transferring stock to employees. - Since
a corporation must have shares available for distribution, it needs the
power to purchase them for that purpose. Because the basic reason for
share distributions to employees disappears once the latter leave the
corporation's employ, employee stock plans usually require the employee
to surrender his shares upon termination of his corporate connection.
The employing corporation must naturally be able to repurchase such
shares to make effective the employee's obligation to surrender them
when their purpose of securing his fathful service has ceased.
1. Close Corporations
Repurchase agreements are even more important for close corpora-
tions.33 In the typical close corporation the shareholders are also the
30. The only exception is Virginia which forbids issuance of fractional shares and,
hence, their repurchase. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-21 (1950). See note 10 supra.
31. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 613 n.45; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 26, at
283-86.
32. Nemmers, supra note 15, at 164; Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corpora-
tion of Its Own Shares: the Substantive Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 697, 715-17 (1941);
Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 606. See also McQuillan v. National Cash Register Co,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940), and Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A2d
652 (Sup. CL 1952), illustrating the use of such incentive plans and their problems. As
to the ever-increasing utilization of such employee-stock purchase plans, and the reasons
therefor, see the recent announcement of the inauguration of such a plan by Merck & Co.,
Inc., in N.Y. Times, April 29, 1959, p. 49, col. 2.
33. See generally, 2 O'Neal, The Close Corporation 1-SO (1958), as to there "buy-sel
agreements. For a carefully drafted restrictive stock transfer agreement not too advan-
tageous to the selling shareholder, see Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 DeL Ch. 343,
152 AUt. 723 (Sup. CL 1930).
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most important employees. The corporate form of business has been
chosen solely for its advantage of limited liability: the participants re-
gard themselves as partners, and desire to have the same control over
the entry of new "partners" as exists in legal partnerships. Such corpora-
tions, therefore, in addition to the typical "veto" powers given share-
holders (to render the corporation as much like a partnership as possi-
ble), usually also have stock repurchase agreements so that the remain-
ing "partners" may determine who shall be their new "partner" when
one of their number dies or decides to terminate his participation. Share-
holder agreements in a close corporation often obligate the corporation,
rather than the individual stockholders, to repurchase the departing (or
departed) shareholder's interest, 4 rendering imperative a corporate
power to repurchase in order to effectuate these agreements.
2. Public Issue Corporations
In the public issue corporation, management may find it more ex-
pedient to buy out recalcitrant minority shareholders (whether or not
they hold redeemable stock or are entitled to appraisal rights) than to
face their constant obstructionism. Such purchases may also be de-
sirable, from management's point of view, to prevent shares from falling
into the hands of syndicates desirous of taking over the corporation
merely to "milk" it (either through liquidation or improvident dividend
payments at the expense of capital improvement), and incidentally, at
least, to protect their own jobs as directors and officers from the in-
evitable dismissal which a change in majority share ownership augurs.3
Prudent share purchases may therefore be used (for good or ill) as a
way of manipulating corporate control.
A second reason for such repurchases is as part of a plan for acquisi-
tion of the assets of another business, to be "paid for" in stock of the
purchasing corporation.
Directors of a public issue corporation may also want to purchase
its shares on behalf of the corporation to "make a market""0 for a new
34. See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 789, 794 (1952). But compare Snee &
Cusack, Principles and Practice of Estate Planning 216-17 (1959), suggesting possible tax
disadvantages from an agreement whereunder the corporation, rather than the rcmaining
shareholders, is to reacquire the shares of a retiring member.
35. E.g., purchase by Axton-Fisher of enough of its own common stock, thus preventing
control from falling into the hands of Transamerica Corp., would have prevented the
"milking" of the corporation which took place in Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162
F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). See also the situation posed in Baker & Cary, Cases on Corpora-
tions 569 (3d ed. Abr. 1959).
36. See Nemmers, The Power of a Corporation To Purchase Its Own Stock, 17 Wis.
L. Rev. 161, 166 (1942):
"Once a corporation's stock is listed on an exchange, it is a common rule of the finandal
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stock or bond issue which might otherwise sell poorly. Purchases of
securities for the purpose of creating an artificial market are forbidden
under the Federal Securities laws, and the regulations promulgated
thereunder by the SEC. "Stabilizing" purchases, or those designed to
prevent the market for a security from falling, although restricted,'7 are
not forbidden. 8 Share purchases to aid marketability desirable from the
corporations' perspective, are, therefore, legally recognized, albeit to a
limited extent. 9
world that such corporation must be prepared to support its stock on the market and
guard it from becoming the football of professional manipulators. For a corporation to
refuse to support its own stock may be fatal, since depressed prices on the stock exchange,
even artificially depressed prices, sooner or later affect sales and credit standings. The
argument for permitting a corporation to deal on the exchanges in its own stock thus is
the same as that which supports the existence of the exchange itself, the 'tabilizing' result
achieved by freetrading."
Nemmers adds, however: "But abuses are unlimited. Dealings confuse earnings and
losses in annual reports under many modem statements which do not distinguish between
an operating statement of ordinary business transactions and a general profit and loss
statement. Such manipulations may throw a corporation into insolvency or deeper into
insolvency. It is true that the majority American rule is hemmed in by the usual fraud and
fiduciary qualifications, but these may be small comfort when the burden of showing
violations is on the plaintiff stockholder, especially where the corporation is large and
the stockholder small." Id. at 167. See also Berle & Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property 175-76 (1932): "On the other hand, there is something to be said for per-
mitting a corporation to buy shares of its own stock, especially where the market machinery
has temporarily broken down. During the panic of November, 1929, many corporations
were urgently asked to use their surplus funds for such purchase. The incidental effect was
to shift the asset values of the remaining outstanding shares. But the motive was to pro-
vide market purchases for shares of stock, and to keep running the mechanism of the public
market. It is difficult to regard this process as anything other than a legitimate use; it was,
in fact, the only available means of safeguarding a decent market appraisal for the bulk of
the stockholders." This theory that "support of the market" purchases are proper is crit-
icized in Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corporation of Its Own Stock, 35 Col. L. Rev. 971,
986-90 (1935).
37. See S.E.C. Rules X-10B-6, X-10B-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-6, 240.10b-7 (Supp.
1958). The effectiveness of these rules is circumscribed by the statutes under whoe au-
thority they were promulgated, and which they are designed to implement. See Nussbaum,
supra note 36, at 1004-0S, as to the inadequacy of these statutes. As to other federal
statutes, see Dodd, supra note 32, at 717-19.
38. However, note the possible danger to directors, at the hands of minority share-
holders, even if they do not violate any S.E.C. regulations. Stella v. KaMser-Frazer, 82
F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
39. Federal law does, however, make "trafficking" in its own shares extremely onerous
for a corporation. Although, as indicated, the obstacles to share repurchases by ordinary
public issue corporations (i.e., those subject to the Securities Act of 1933, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but not to such specialized statutes a% eg., the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935) are not particularly significant, sales of treasury
stock by such corporations are subject to the same requirements as would be an original
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The Model Act and most modern corporate statutes, recognizing a
corporation's desire to make purchases for these and other unantici-
pated reasons, grant a blanket right to purchase from earned surplus, 4
and, where the Articles so provide, or two-thirds of the voting share-
holders consent, from surplus however created.41 Such an over-all grant,
rather than a specification of the exact circumstances under which the
power may be exercised, is undoubtedly a recognition of the limitations
of human foreseeability of the sundry situations when the board of
directors may legitimately desire to purchase their corporation's shares.
Is the grant perhaps too broad, too general, so as to be a potential danger
to creditors and shareholders of the corporation, and thereby quite be-
yond the actual intent of the legislatures enacting such statutes? It is
submitted that such is the case, even though in this second category,
purchases may only be made from surplus.
Since in the Model Act and its offspring the grant to purchase from
issue of new stock. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 776(1)
(1958). Thus, such a corporation will be required under section 5 of the 1933 Act to file a
registration statement or, what is regarded by the practicing bar as equally burdensome, the
"notification" required for "small issues," 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (Supp. 1958), and comply
with the other requirements which are part of this process, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230A00-.493
(Supp. 1958), if it desires to sell any of the reacquired shares.
40. See note 16 supra for definition.
41. Section 5 of the Model Act permits purchases to be made under such circumstances
from "capital surplus." It is clear from the definition of "net assets," "stated capital,"
"surplus," "earned surplus," and "capital surplus" (see note 16 supra), that all net assets
which are not earned surplus constitute capital surplus, since it is merely the balance
remaining after debts, stated capital and earned surplus have been subtracted from total
assets. Capital surplus is, therefore, a "catch-all." It includes reduction surplus (§ 64), a
surplus which may be created directly by act of the shareholders (§ 63 or §§ 53 and 54)
through simply voting to reduce stated capital, or indirectly, by act of the board of
directors in voting to retire repurchased shares (§ 62), automatically by voting to acquire
redeemable shares (§ 61), and through allocation by the directors of no-par consideration
on issue to capital surplus (§ 19). It is to be observed that the size of the capital of the
corporation is, therefore, completely at the disposal of its shareholders and directors. The
actual asset fund on which the creditors may call for satisfaction of the debts owed them
may well vary in direct proportion to the size of this stated capital. At most they are
given constructive notice of their lessened protection through the annual report of § 118(g)
(as to the amount which has not been allocated to capital surplus with regard to no-par
shares) and the filing requirements of §§ 63 and 57 (for §§ 53 and 54 changes) where the
stated capital has been reduced directly, and §§ 61 and 62 where the stated capital has been
reduced indirectly (through share repurchases). Presumably such capital surplus may
be created through a reappraisal of the value of the corporation's assets in a time of
economic inflation (if the assets figure increases, while the subtractors of debts and earned
surplus remain constant, manifestly the balance, capital surplus will be a higher figure).
One sentence in the articles of incorporation will make all these freed assets available for
share repurchases. Since most corporations will probably insert this sentence, the ultimate
effect is (if the technicalities are complied with) to make virtually all assets available for
share purchases, until the corporation is no longer able to pay its debts as they mature.
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surplus is a general one, and enumerated instances concern only pur-
chases from capital, a consideration of these dangers divides itself most
appropriately into a discussion based on the sources from which share
repurchases are to be allowed. It is probably safe to conclude initially,
however, from the many instances in which American corporations have
exercised the power in the past, with judicial approbation and without
shockingly harmful effects upon creditors and shareholders, that the
English rule of absolute disqualification should be rejected. Generally
speaking, share purchases by a corporation should be allowed. Clearly
the corporation has an "interest" in making such purchases, at least in
the situations delineated above. The only question then becomes one of
qualifications upon the exercise of the right. This problem, as is the
case with most legal investigations, reduces itself to an evaluation of
competing interests ( a choice of harmful vs. beneficial effects to each
group) in a trichotomy which also includes creditors and shareholders
of the corporation.
II. PURCHASES FROM CAPITAL
Even if the concept of capital as a "trust fund" for the creditors of a
corporation be rejected, 2 it is still well-established that one of the
basic reasons behind the requirement is to provide for sufficient corporate
assets to discharge corporate obligations.4 3 A subsidiary function of
capital is the protection of senior shareholders of a corporation by grant-
ing them some assurance that there will be sufficient corporate assets
available to discharge their liquidation preferences:" The requirement
also inures ultimately to the benefit of all shareholders, since it is at least
a limited guarantee against improvident distributions of their contribu-
tions and resultant financial collapse of the corporation.
Although the introduction of no-par stock 0 and "liberal" allowance of
42. For an explanation and criticism of this theory, see Stevens, Corporations 870-75,
906 (1949).
43. Ballantine, Corporations 571-72 (rev. ed. 1946). A similar function is performed to
a very limited extent by § 51 of the Model Act which requires that a minimum considera-
tion of $1000 be paid in for the shares before a corporation may enjoy de jure existence.
44. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 571-72.
45. Although the Model Act (1953 rev.) required that at least 75o of the considera-
tion received for no-par shares be allocated to stated capital (§ 19), that requirement was
deleted by the 1957 Addendum. Except for preference shares for which an amount equal
to any liquidation preference must be allocated to stated capital, the Model Act would now
permit allocation of "any portion" of the consideration received for no-par aes to
capital surplus, thus making it available for share repurchases. The Model Act as amended,
therefore, makes capital (where no-par shares have been issued) almost as ilusory a pro-
tection for creditors and shareholders as it is under the New Jersey statute, vhich allows
a smila allocation, N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:8-6,-S (1937), and makes the surplus thus created
available even for dividends, NJ. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:8-19 (1937). Coupled with the other
techniques of reducing stated capital (see note 89 infra), it is so easy to build up capital
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charter amendments reducing capital 6 have created serious restrictions
upon the effectiveness of the device, the salutary purpose of the require-
ment remains unaltered.47
It is obvious that whatever reduces the sum of liquid (or liquifiable)
corporate assets reduces the fund on which creditors and shareholders
may rely for satisfaction of their respective debts or equity claims.
Under modern statutes not all of the money contribution of shareholders
need be assigned to this fund. 8 Even that which is so assigned is sub-
ject to fluctuation in realizable value not only as the general economy
goes up and down, but as the preferences of the public for the product
dealt in by the corporation change.49 It is therefore clear that capital
sets at most a minimal requirement for the full satisfaction of obligations
to creditors and shareholders. No matter how defined, any "impairment
of capital," or diminution of this fund, is undesirable from the point of
surplus by diverting capital, that only restrictions on "utilization" of that surplus can be
relied upon to give even minimal protection to creditors and shareholders. Such limitation
on the utilization of capital surplus is obviously a simpler task than a complete revamping
of the financial provisions of the Act. One way of preserving the asset fund at a level high
enough to afford the protection which capital itself was traditionally designed to perform,
is at least to limit share repurchases to actually earned surplus, thereby plugging at least
one hole in the dike gouged out by the easy techniques of converting capital into a
spurious (capital) surplus.
46. As to the ease of reducing stated capital under the Model Act and its offspring, see
note 89 infra.
47. To "the extent that the consideration received by the corporation for no-par shares
may be diverted to surplus directly, or stated capital reduced at the will of the share-
holders, the protection afforded to creditors from capital requirements becomes more and
more an illusory safeguard. At least constructive notice of such diversions from the capital
to surplus accounts must be given. Therefore, although the capital requirements under
the Act may not do much to make the position of creditors and senior shareholders enviable,
that position would be worsened still by a complete abandonment of the stated capital
requirement which provides at least a temporary sandbag levee holding the corporate
assets in bounds. Certainly, if dangers are great this can be no argument that they should
be greater. However, it supplies a convincing argument that general share repurchases
should be forbidden from capital surplus, i.e., that such repurchases be made only from
actually earned surplus.
48. E.g., through use of no-par stock. See notes 45 and 47 supra. Accountants may
object to the use of the term "fund" to describe legal capital, since, of course, technically,
legal capital is not a fund. However, the term is an appropriate shorthand expression
(much like saying that dividends are paid "out of" surplus) for the effect of legal capital
on the asset position of the corporation: as an item on the righthand side of the balance
sheet (unless it reveals an impairment, itself a red flag to creditors and stockholders) it
must be counterbalanced by the items on the left or asset side, necessitating maintenance of
a sufficient asset pot.
49. A corporation, of course, may invest its assets, even those represented by stated
capital in goods and products of fluctuating value. E.g., public taste for the furniture
which a furniture store has invested in, will, of course, alter the value of those assets, See
Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 533.
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view of creditors and all shareholders (except those who receive prefer-
ential treatment in the disposition of this "capital").
For this reason most jurisdictions (except where statutes expressly
authorize such purchases, and then only under the special conditions
therein prescribed) forbid share repurchases by a corporation out of
capital."' A notable exception is Massachusetts, which, lacking a specific
statute on the subject, permits purchases even out of capital, provided
such purchases are made "in good faith and without prejudice to the
rights of creditors or other shareholders."' ' It would seem well nigh
impossible to find a situation in which some prejudice would not result
from such purchases, at least to creditors, since such purchases obviously
result in a subtraction from the fund on which they may call for pay-
ment of what is due them. Perhaps in acknowlegment of this fact the
Model Act, and statutes based on it, only allow such purchases from
capital in the four extraordinary situations which constitute the first
category of purchases discussed above. - In only two of these four cases,
however, can it be really conceded that the potential disadvantages to
creditors are outweighed by other considerations.
A. Redeemable Shares
The Model Act's approval of the purchase of redeemable shares out
of capital is qualified by the limitation contained in section 60,03 which
provides:
No redemption or purchase of redeemable shares shall be made by a corporation
-when it is insolvent or when such redemption or purchase would render it insolvent,
or which would reduce the net assets below the aggregate amount payable to the
holders of shares having prior or equal rights to the assets of the corporation upon
involuntary dissolution.
The effect of this provision is to protect those senior shareholders
who have a liquidation preference in a manner analogous to that pro-
tection extended creditors by the bankruptcy insolvency test. It must
be conceded that this limitation also affords some protection to creditors.
Since the limitation is in terms of the total assets required to satisfy
merely the liquidation preference of shareholders, and hence the fund
is perhaps not as large as it would be were purchases or calls which
reduced assets below liabilities interdicted (it must be recalled that only
equity and not bankruptcy insolvency is forbidden), it is true that the
asset fund thus frozen would be available to the creditors in priority
50. Ballantine, op. dt. supra note 43, at 604. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 42, at
275-76.
51. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 607.
52. See note 13 supra.
53. See note 17 supra.
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to the preference shareholders for whom it was ostensibly set up.54
An additional protection to both creditors and shareholders (whose
shares are not purchased) is the proviso in section 5 that the purchase
price may not exceed the price at which the shares may be called.
These provisions are the most restrictive on share repurchases found
in the Model Act. Yet, although such purchases may not cause insolv-
ency, they do reduce capital, and are, as a result, disadvantageous to
creditors.55 Even if a redeemable shareholder be regarded as a species
of corporate creditor,56 is there any justification for favoring him in
preference to the other, and the only legally recognized, creditors, which
is the real effect of such a grant of power? A corporation may be a long
way on the road to failure without actually being insolvent (in either
the equity or bankruptcy sense). The Model Act allows the directors to
"bail out" favored shareholders with no loss, and perhaps even a profit
(since the shares may be redeemed at call price when in a failing cor-
poration the market price, and hence cost to the shareholder, may be
considerably less), 5 at the possible expense of creditors"8 and junior
stockholders. For adequate protection of the latter, purchase of re-
54. On a bankruptcy distribution or reorganization, even unsecured creditors take
priority over preferred shareholders. See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 1787, 6 id. at 2858 (14th ed.
1956).
55. Redeemable shares are automatically retired by reacquisition (Model Act § 61), thus
automatically reducing stated capital where such reacquisitions are made, as the Model Act
authorizes them to be, from capital. It is to be observed that under the Model Act such
capital reduction is accomplished by the board of directors without the necessity for share-
holder approval, and has the effect of leaving the corporate surplus unimpaired and
hence available for dividend distribution or other share repurchases. See, however, N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 55-52(g) (Supp. 1959), under which redeemable shares are not automatically
cancelled by reacquisition.
56. Which, of course, legally he is not. See cases cited note 23 supra, and Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 43, at 503.
57. Only one modern statute even attempts to prevent this fruitful opportunity for
insider profits. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(b) (1) (1957), with certain exceptions, forbids
redemption at more than the net asset value attributable to the shares being redeemed
when this is below the call price. The object is to prevent the scooping off of dwindling
assets for favored shareholders. If, as is probable, the market price will roughly approxi-
mate this asset position, some safeguard against the speculation envisaged is provided.
58. Even if it be conceded that creditors are given adequate protection by a bankruptcy
insolvency restriction on share repurchases (e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(c) (1957), N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-52(e)(2) (Supp. 1959), and Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03F (1953)), and
the welfare of junior shareholders may be disregarded as part of the risks of common
stock ownership, it should be observed that the Model Act does not even protect all of the
senior shareholders. If there are not enough assets to bail out all of them, the directors arc
at liberty to discriminate as they choose. Thus the Model Act provision does not even
protect all of those whom it was designated to favor. It will perhaps come as a surprise to
many people that the New York Stock Exchange has been more of a leader in corporate
morality than the state legislatures have been. Since 1899, corporations wishing to have
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their securities traded on that exchange have had to execute a "Listing Agreement," which
currently provides with regard to redemption: "The Corporation will not select any of its
securities listed on the Exchange for redemption otherwise than by lot or pro rata, and
will not set a redemption date earlier than fifteen days after the date corporate action is
taken to authorize the redemption." New York Stock Exchange Company Manual § 1(9),
at A-24.
Although not expressly required to do so by the Listing Agreement, the Exchange also
expects the same equitable procedures to be used where purchases by a corporation are to
be made of any of its shares, redeemable or not. See New York Stock Exchange Company
Manual A-10, 24, 179-SO.
Such linits on redemption and purchase of redeemable shares would seem essential addi-
tions to any provision designed to give effective protection to the rights of redeemable
shareholders. Yet the Model Act omits them. Of the modern corporation act% only North
Carolina attempts to insure that repurchases and redemptions will be equitable to the
entire class whose shares are being reacquired by a provision requiring pro rata purchas
where general share purchases are not approved by the shareholders or do not fall under one
of the exceptions of the section. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52 (Supp. 1959). On the other
hand, only Texas provides for ratable or lot selection of redeemable shares. Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act art. 4.03 (1953). Additional protection is given redeemable stockholders by such
statutes as those of Oregon (Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.390 (1959)); Wieconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 180.385(1)(b) (1957)), and North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-52(e)(3), (4), (f)
(Supp. 1959)).
Clearly, no redemption of the shares of a corporation, even when the holders whose
shares are to be redeemed are fairly chosen, should be permitted to rduc the remaining
assets below those required to meet the liquidation preferences of those unredeemed (or of
those shareholders prior in right to them). This is what these statutes are des'gned to
forbid. A limitation forbidding reacquisitions except from earned surplus would ac-
complish the same results more simply. The real effectiveness of such a restriction, how-
ever, depends on the ease with which capital surplus may be converted by corporate fiat
into earned surplus. Although as pointed out, note 16 supra, the Model Act definitions of
"stated capital," "surplus," "earned surplus" etc., are an improvement in clarity, a grave
danger is created by Model Act § 64, which allows directors to convert capital surplus into
earned surplus. (See Model Act § 2(k),(1),(m), comment.) The greater the ease with
which this transfer may be accomplished, the less meaningful does a distinction between
earned and capital surplus become in terms of legal consequences. Therefore, unless more
stringent limits on transfers of capital to earned surplus are applied, a more appropriate
definition of earned surplus for purposes of limiting share repurchases would be similar to
the share repurchase section of the wiser grandfather of modern corporation laws, Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 32, § 157.6 (Smith-Hurd 1954), with the more modem "capital surplus" substituted
for "paid-in" surplus:
"A corporation shall have power to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise acquire, hold,
own, pledge, transfer, or otherwise dispose of its own shares, provided that it shall not
purchase, either directly or indirectly, its own shares when its net assets are less than the
sum of its stated capital, its paid-in surplus, any surplus arising from unrealied apprecia-
tion in value or revaluation of its assets and any surplus arising from surrender to the
corporation of any of its shares, or when by so doing its net assets would be reduced below
such sum."
The District of Columbia has adopted the linois earned surplus limitation. See D.C.
Code Ann. § 29.904a (Supp. 1959).
As to surplus under modem corporation laws, see generally Hackney, The Financial
Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1358-92 (1957).
Hackney suggests that the Model Act provisions are not without ambiguity. He also sug-
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deemable shares should be allowed only out of earned surplus, and
treated as any other share purchase from such source. 0
B. Compromising Corporate Claims
The second extraordinary situation in which the Model Act permits
share repurchases out of capital is for the purpose of "collecting or
gests that there is some ambiguity as to whether the four extraordinary purchases per-
mitted under the Act may be made from stated capital even where earned surplus is also
available. Id. at 1398. It seems clear that the drafter intended that such purchases be
permitted. Hackney approves the exceptional treatment accorded by the Model Act to
purchases "(1) and (4), and perhaps (2)," i.e., elimination of fractional shares, redemption
of redeemable shares, and possibly, collecting or compromising indebtedness. Id. at 1399. He
further suggests other purchases which should be permitted from capital, but are not,
namely, to permit a conversion privilege, and a stock exchange as part of a recapital-
ization (presumably, such as in Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 154, 15
A.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1940)). Ibid. The author, for reasons indicated in the body of this
paper, feels that exception (1) is unnecessary, disapproves of exception (4), would allow
exception (3), which Hackney would forbid (at 1399), and approves of exception (2) with
suggested limitations.
As for the exercise of conversion privileges, the author feels that, if no undesirable
features appear, they will be construed as not being "purchases," and, hence, not restricted by
the Model Act. With regard to any feature of a recapitalization, the Model Act is, if any-
thing, overgenerous through its permissible ease of capital reduction, and hence no additional
exceptions are needed. Certainly a Shanik-type of recapitalization, i.e., creation of a prior
preference preferred, which, without their vote, the old preferred shareholders are given the
choice of taking in exchange for their old shares on which large arrearages have accrued-
or else (the typical totalitarian political choice), should not be fostered.
Hackney also points out that the Model Act, through excluding treasury shares from net
assets (§ 2(i)), and at the same time restricting surplus used for their repurchase (§ 5),
doubles the "adverse effect caused by the purchase." Hackney, supra at 1393. He means
that only half as many shares can be repurchased with the same amount of surplus as
would otherwise be the case, unless the repurchased shares are retired. Rather than a
defect, this seems to be a bright spot in the otherwise dim picture created by the Act.
59. Under § 61 of the Model Act and most modern corporation statutes, reacquisition of
redeemable shares by either purchase or redemption has the effect of automatically retiring
the shares so reacquired. Thus an automatic reduction in stated capital results. If such
reacquisitions may be made from capital or general surplus, the effect is to leave the
surplus intact. See note 15 supra. While reacquisitions from earned surplus will likewise
leave the total surplus intact, the requirement will result in converting that portion of it
used for the reacquisitions into capital surplus, thus, if purchases generally are similarly re-
stricted to earned surplus, making it unavailable for dividends (Model Act § 40(a)) or
additional share reacquisitions, with their consequent dilution of the total asset fund. Re-
quiring that reacquisitions of redeemable shares be made from earned surplus has the
effect, therefore, of keeping the actual asset fund at a higher level. This affords protection
to creditors and shareholders continuing on in the corporation. These latter do not care
by what name their protective fund is called, or by what "technicalities" it is secured. The
effect is the thing, and such a "technicality" as requiring reacquisition to be from earned
surplus effectively keeps their fund at a higher level than would otherwise be the case.
They are, therefore, safeguarded pro tanto. See, however, note 58 supra; note 97 infra;
Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 612; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 42, at 282.
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compromising indebtedness to the corporation." A corporation is norm-
ally allowed to accept its shares in compromise of a claim which it
holds, even though this works a technical impairment of capitalFP As
Stevens states:
Even though such a transaction results in the cancellation of a debt due the cor-
poration in return for the shares, it is a bona fide business transaction, and, because
it saves the corporation from greater loss, cannot be complained of by creditors.01
Normally such compromises, even if they necessitate small payments
by the corporation to the debtor where the value of the shares are in
excess of the indebtedness, are unexceptionable. Abuses are, however,
possible. Loans to corporate insiders (directors and officers,,' and in the
New York statute,'s shareholders) are often forbidden. Yet, "sales" to
such insiders are not. Insiders might well make transfers to their friends
of valuable corporate assets on credit, later "compromising" such debts
for corporate stock on which they had placed an inflated value. The
danger of such abuses is slight in the face of traditional rules of fiduciary
obligation,64 and manifestly the harm to creditors (unless the "com-
promises" include large payments by the corporation) from the impair-
ment of capital is offset by the diminution in the corporation's dividend
obligations. Nevertheless, for the adequate protection of creditors such
compromises should be expressly required to be bona fide,ca as has been
60. See 6A Fletcher, Private Corporations § 2857 (rev. ed. 1950); Ballantine, op. cit.
supra note 43, at 606.
61. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 42, at 278.
62. E.g., Model Act § 42.
63. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 59.
64. See, e.g., the high standard of fiduciary duty set in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955). Quaere: the effect of the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alteius"
on such a statute as § 43 of the Model Act, which expressly enumerates a number of
grounds of directorial liability, but omits the one suggested.
65. Another interesting problem, and another one not dealt with specifically by the
Model Act, is that of gifts of shares to a corporation. Normally, such reacquiitions would
be an unexpected boon to the corporation, and obviously of no harm to either shareholders
or creditors. They would, therefore, if anything, be even less objectionable than receiving
shares in compromise of an indebtedness. However, a gift of shares to a corporation may
be a way of escaping statutory liability to creditors (including employee creditors), and,
consequently, undesirable from the latter's point of view. For example, New Yorh makes
sharcholders individually liable for wages owing to corporate employees. N.Y. Stock Corp.
Law § 71. A donation (or bequest) of shares to the corporation would provide an effec-
tive means of escape from such statutory liability. Although such statutes rendering share-
holders individually liable for corporate obligations are on the wane, Ballantine, op. cit.
supra note 43, at 820-23, gifts to a corporation of its shares might still be u ed in a situa-
tion possible under most corporation statutes today. The general rule is that creditors may
compel shareholders to pay any unpaid balance due on their share subscriptions. Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 43, at 782. If shareholders are at liberty to surrender their shares to
their corporation, thus terminating their liability, a major loophole for fraud on creditors
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done in Maryland"' and Texas, 7 two Model Act states.0 8
C. Dissenting Stockholders
Creditors are technically harmed, through capital impairment, when
capital is used to pay off dissenting shareholders who exercise their
appraisal right.69 They may be harmed even more if a minority share-
holder is allowed to "hold up" a corporation about to enter into a merger,
consolidation, or advantageous sale of assets.
Furthermore, since, as a practical matter, dissenters are necessarily
less than one-third of the shareholders,"0 and usually an insignificant
number, the capital impairment is unlikely to be great. For these
reasons, and because it would be anomalous for the majority share-
holders to object to such payments, even though out of capital,7 ' they
should be allowed.
As with the compromise provision, however, the Model Act verbiage
leaves much to be desired. It provides that a corporation may purchase
its shares for the purpose of "paying dissenting shareholders entitled to
payment for their shares under the provisions of this Act." Presumably
the provisions referred to are section 71 (Rights of Dissenting Share-
holders in Mergers or Consolidations) and section 74 (Rights of Dissent-
ing Shareholders Upon Sale or Exchange of Assets), which require the
is provided. A guarantee against such abuse might be provided by a provision like that
of Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(d) (1957): "No acquisition by any corporation by gift,
bequest or purchase of shares of its own stock which have not been fully paid shall release,
or be made the basis of a release of, the liability of the holders thereof unless the assets of
the corporation remaining immediately after such release shall be not less than the debts of
the corporation plus the amount of its stated capital." Even such innocuous appearing re-
acquisitions should thus at least be required to be bona fide. Note also the possible use of
donated shares as part of a scheme for issuance of discount shares. Ballantine, op. cit. supra
note 43, at 800. As to the general rule allowing a corporation to accept a gift or bequest
of its shares, see 6A Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 60, at 396-97.
66. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(a) (3) (ii) (1957).
67. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03(B) (1953).
68. A further safeguard is to restrict the permission solely to acceptance of shares In
compromise of indebtedness, without granting the implied power (through use of the
word "purchase") to make settlements which may require cash payments to the debtors
on such compromises. Certainly any such payments should be forbidden from capital.
Reacquisitions in discharge of indebtedness, of course, also raise the same problems as the
acceptance of gifts of its shares by a corporation. See note 65 supra.
69. See Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 606, as to the recognition of such reacquisi-
tions.
70. For example, the Model Act only allows appraisal rights in the case of mergers or
consolidations (§ 71) or sales or exchanges of assets other than in the regular course of
business (§ 74). These, however, require two-thirds shareholder approval (§ 67 as to mergers
and consolidations; § 73(b) as to sale or exchange of assets). Dissenters must of necessity
constitute less than one-third of the shareholders.
71. See generally Lattin, Corporations 533-34 (1959).
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corporation to pay the dissenting shareholder "the fair value" of his
shares. Perhaps the intent was to forbid a corporation to pay more than
the fair value when repurchasing such shares. Still, on its plain meaning,
the paragraph only indicates whose shares may be bought, and not the
amount which may be paid for them. Manifestly, the interests of
creditors and remaining shareholders demand that no bonus be paid
from capital to dissidents. Adequate protection requires the proviso that
repurchases may be made at no more than fair value, or, at the very
least, that directors make such purchases in good faith."-
It might be argued that such explicit dictates that share repurchases
be made in good faith are unnecessary in view of the developing, and
ever more stringent, common-law rules of fiduciary duty.1 3 The argu-
ment would be forceful were it not for the Model Act's express provision
for director liability with respect to corporate purchases of shares "con-
trary to the provisions of this Act."74 Since neither the actions warned
of here or in the compromise of claims exception would directly contra-
vene the provisions of the Act, courts might well refuse to find liability
for acts not expressly proscribed. In this judicial determination that
common law rules of fiduciary obligation were supplanted by the unquali-
fied statutory grant, they would be supported by the maxim of statutory
construction, expressuz facit cessare taciturn. At any rate it is undesira-
ble that statutes should engender ambiguities.
D. Fractional Shares
The remaining Model Act exception to repurchase only out of surplus
is to retire fractional shares, which normally would result only from stock
dividends. Such dividends mean a transfer of surplus to capital, and
hence an improvement of the creditor's position.73 A slight reduction in
this bonus capital to retire fractional shares should thus give the creditor
no grounds for complaint. Although such fractional shares are usually the
result of such dividends, the Model Act does not require that they be.
There would appear to be nothing to prevent a corporation from issuing
all of its stock in fractional shares (Model Act sections 14 and 22),
should it choose to do so, and thus effectively circumvent any restrictions
on share repurchases. Unless the issuance of fractional shares is limited,
therefore, their repurchase should only be allowed out of earned surplus.
Furthermore, even if fractional shares are limited to those resulting from
stock dividends, there would appear to be no valid reason for permitting
72. Texas requires this. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03B (1953).
73. See note 64 supra.
74. Model Act § 43 (b).
75. See Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 481-S3. But note that even here abues
are possible, since allocation of surplus to capital does not always take place.
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them to be purchased out of capital, since no prudent corporation would
declare a stock dividend which completely exhausted its surplus.10
Another defect in the Model Act with regard to share acquisitions in
this entire extraordinary class of capital purchases is its failure to re-
quire the exhaustion of surplus for such repurchases before the capital
account may be eaten into. Clearly, if a corporation has a surplus, it
should be required to utilize it completely before dipping into its capital,
no matter how cogent may be the reasons for share reacquisitions.
Thus, of the four Model Act exceptions to its general rule that share
repurchases may only be made from surplus, in only two, buying out
dissenting stockholders at the appraisal value of their stock and accept-
ing shares in compromise of an indebtedness, are the harmful effects
upon creditors and other shareholders sufficiently outweighed to justify
allowance of such purchases from the capital fund. And even these
exceptions are so poorly drafted as to make them inadequate. Of course,
these defects would not be objectionable had they not passed from the
merely theoretical into the positive law of so many jurisdictions."
IV. PURCHASES FROM SURPLUS
Contrary to the English rule, most American jurisdictions, apart from
express statutory grant, permit a corporation to repurchase its shares
where only surplus is used.7 The Model Act and many modern corpora-
76. There would seem to be no good reason for the issuance of fractional shares of stock
anyhow as opposed to scrip or rights to purchase. Certificates are not normally issued for
such partial shares, and although scrip is recognized, fractional shares are not traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. A corporation may give a holder entitled to a fractional
share the choice of putting up sufficient money to buy a full share or of having his frac-
tional interest "sold," i.e., paired off with another such partial share to give a full share to a
holder who chooses to exercise his right, with cash payment from the latter to the one
who elects not to make up the difference. Since in a going concern, the fractional share
problem may always be handled in this manner, or by retirement from surplus, there would
seem to be no need either for the issuance of fractional share certificates, or for their
repurchase from capital.
77. See note 10 supra.
78. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 604; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 42, at 275. See
6A Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 60, at 364: "Subject to severe criticism the majority of the
American courts have taken the view that a solvent corporation may lawfully purchase and
hold its own stock without express authority, in the absence of express restrictions, provided
it acts in good faith and without prejudice to the rights of creditors, and has a surplus
with which to make the purchase." The "severe criticism" refers to the unheeded warnings
of law review authors and text writers. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 609, lists six
dangers from such dealings by a corporation in its own shares. Only one significant legal
writer, my late predecessor as professor of corporation law at Fordham, I. Maurice
Wormser, has defended the majority American rule. Wormser, The Power of a Corpora-
tion To Acquire Its Own Stock, 24 Yale L.J. 177 (1915). A bibliography of materials on
the subject will be found in Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 35, at 1053.
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tion statutes allow purchases out of "earned surplus" for any purpose,"
and without limitation, except that these purchases may not be made
when insolvency (in the equity sense) is present, or would ensue from
such purchases.""
The Model Act also permits (with only the same insolvency restric-
tion) such purchases from any type of surplus8' if two-thirds of the
voting shareholders approve, or if the articles of incorporation so per-
mit. 2 Since it is customary for corporations to take advantage of any
79. Model Act § 5; Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1958); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 29-904a (Supp. 1959); Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(b)(3) (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
55-52(c) (Supp. 1959); N.D. Rev. Code § 10-1905 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.035
(Supp. 1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03C (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-4 (1950); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 180385(I)(c)(2) (1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.35(B) (Page Supp.
1959); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 1510 (Supp. 1957).
80. Model Act § 5, insolvency defined § 2(n) (see also comment); Alaska Comp. Laws
Ann. § 36-2A-13, insolvency defined § 36-2A-2(n) (Supp. 1958); N.D. Rev. Code § 10-1905
(Supp. 1957), insolvency defined § 10-1902(14); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-4 (1950), insolvency
defined § 13.1-2(k). Three of the modem corporation states impose both equity and bank-
ruptcy insolvency limitations on such repurchases. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(c) (1957);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52(e) (Supp. 1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03(F) (1953). The
remaining modem states, although some only impose the equity insolvency test, add addi-
tional limitations designed to protect prior or equal ranking shareholders from asset dilation.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52(e)(3)-(4), (f) (Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.390 (Supp.
1959); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180385(1)(b) (1957). The District of Columbia Act, D.C. Stat.
Ann. § 29-904a(d) (Supp. 1959), only expressly makes the insolvency test applicable to
purchases of redeemable shares, and imposes the additional restriction (but only on reacqul-
sitions of such shares) that the net assets will not be reduced below the aggregate amount
payable to holders of shares having prior or equal rights upon dissolution. The failure to
impose any insolvency limitation, except on reacquisition of redeemable shares, is not as
dangerous as it first appears since general share repurchases may only be made from earned
surplus. However, the three other Model Act capital reacquisitions are unrestricted by any
insolvency limitation.
81. I.e., also "capital surplus," which includes all surplus which is not earned surplus.
See Model Act § 2(m), and note 40 supra.
82. Model Act § 5. Similar provisions are found in Alaska Comp. Lawss Ann. § 36-ZA-
13 (Supp. 1958); N.D. Rev. Code § 10-1905 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.035 (Supp.
1959); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03D (1953); and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.385(1)(c)(1)
(1957). Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-4 (1950) expressly allows purchases from "capital surplus,"
without the necessity for either shareholder approval or charter provision, while Md. Ann.
Code art. 23, § 32(b)(3) (1957), and N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-52(c) (Supp. 1959), expresly
allow purchases to be made out of "surplus," unqualified as to kind, and hence, including
capital surplus (See Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 24, 25 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5-49
(Supp. 1959)). Of the modem corporation statutes, only the District of Columbia, while
allowing the four extraordinary Model Act purchases from capital, confines all other pur-
chases to earned surplus. D.C. Stat. Ann. § 29-904a (Supp. 1959).
Thus, with but one exception, modem corporation statutes permit utilization of any
surplus for share repurchases, provided formalities are complied with. See also Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1701.35(B) (Page Supp. 1959), which forbids purchases resulting in a
diminution of assets below stated capital plus liabilities (= surplus).
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permissive feature of the corporation statutes, it is to be anticipated
that all corporations incorporated under these modern statutes will
allow such purchases.
It may thus be fairly stated that under the Model Act, and its
progeny, almost any corporation may repurchase any of its shares out
of any type of surplus, no matter how created.18 Creditors can certainly
have no legitimate objection to share repurchases from earned surplus,
since their extension of credit is not justifiably made in reliance upon
this fund as a security for payment.8 4  Purchases (such as those of
redeemable and fractional shares)" which might be undesirable if made
from capital cannot be viewed as objectionable from the point of view
of creditors where made from earned surplus, the corporation's profit,
even though their position would of course be better still with the sur-
plus unexpended.
83. Since earned surplus is universally utilizable, and if formalities are observed (i.e.,
charter provision or shareholder approval, where necessary), capital surplus (the rest of
surplus) likewise becomes available, all surplus is therefore utilizable. The sole exception
among modern corporation statutes, as the term is herein used, is the District of Columbia,
which restricts general share repurchases to "actually" earned surplus.
84. Whether creditors actually do rely on capital or not is a mooted point. Certainly
enlightened and large creditors do, if their requirement for personal guaranties of significant
obligations in corporations which they suspect are undercapitalized Is any indication (as
has been the author's experience in the case of newly organized small corporations making
large loans from banks). Whether they actually do rely, however, seems less significant
than whether they have the "right" to so rely, a right which is not too high a price for
businessmen to pay for the privilege of limited liability. On the other hand, while they
might also prefer to have earned surplus at their beck and call, under traditional legal
theory they have no such right to rely on this profit item as a guarantee for their pay-
ment. The proprietor of the corner stationery store who sells the corporation one box of
pencils may not know or care about the difference between corporate capital and surplus.
Since the legal distinctions have been in force for so long, however, it is not unreasonable
to assume that larger creditors will apprise themselves of the capital-surplus situation of
a corporation and guide themselves accordingly. See, as to the function of capital, Ballan-
tine, op. cit. supra note 43, at 570-72. See the famous statement of Mitchell, J., in Hospes
v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 198, 50 N.W. 1117, 1121 (1892):
Inasmuch as the capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit, its financial standing
and reputation in the community has its source in, and is founded upon, the amount of
its professed and supposed capital, and every one who deals with it does so upon the faith
of that standing and reputation, although, as a matter of fact, he may have no personal
knowledge of the amount of its professed capital, and in a majority of cases knows nothing
about the shares of stock held by any particular stockholder, or, if so, what was paid
for them. . . . The misrepresentation as to the amount of capital would operate as a fraud
on such a creditor as fully and effectually as if he had personal knowledge of the existence
of the defendants' stock, and believed it to have been paid for when he gave the credit.
As to creditor non-reliance on capital, see Guthmann & Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy
437 (3d ed. 1955), and some proof of the theory in Bing Crosby Minute Maid Corp. v.
Eaton, 46 Cal. 2d 484, 297 P.2d 5 (1956).
85. If the latter are permitted. See note 76 supra where the necessity for such fractional
shares is questioned.
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Though creditors' preferences may be disregarded under the circum-
stances, there would seem to be no reason for allowing a corporation to
purchase redeemable shares (even if only out of surplus) for more than
the redemption price, since they might always be called at the latter
price.8 6
While fractional shares may only be justifiably issued as part of a
stock dividend, there would seem to be no reason why the issuing cor-
poration should want to repurchase such shares at more than the amount
allocated to capital on their issuance8 7 Otherwise, shareholders whose
shares were repurchased would receive a dividend greater than that
received by other shareholders, and would thus give the unfavored
shareholders reasonable ground for complaint.
It is interesting to note that these restrictions, desirable even when
the shares are being purchased out of surplus, are completely omitted
by the Model Act even though it permits purchases for these very
purposes to be made from the more sacrosanct capital.
Reasonable objections from the unfavored shareholders may perhaps
be sufficiently satisfied by recommendations to be made later. Before
dealing generally with shareholder rights in stock repurchases, however,
certain creditor objections to such repurchases even out of surplus (as
defined in the Model Act) should first be considered.
As indicated above, the Model Act permits share repurchases not only
from "earned surplus" but also from "capital surplus," which includes
every other type of surplus, since under the Model Act definitions capital
surplus is that excess of net assets over stated capital which is not earned
surplus.
The Act is, therefore, silent as to the problem raised by such cases
as Randall v. Bailey,"8 a New York decision which held that an un-
realized appreciation, due solely to the economic inflation, in the value
of realty owned by a corporation would constitute surplus. Under the
86. Although the Model Act forbids such repurchases at more than the redemption
price from capital, it does not make clear a similar limitation on the price to be paid
where only surplus is used. It is followed in this ambiguity by all of the modern cor-
poration laws, except Maryland (Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 32(b)(1) (1957)) and Texas
(Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.09(A)(1) (1953)).
87. Neither the Model Act, nor any of the modern corporation statutes contain such a
restriction. While purchases above par (or consideration allocated to stated capital from
no-par shares) may be justifiable in the case of securities outstanding for some time, no
such justification appears in the case of fractional shares which, as a corporate frea , will
presumably be retired almost immediately after issuance.
88. 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942). Fortunately, such "dubious" accounting policy
is not widely followed. Ballantine, Corporations 541, 574 (rev. ed. 1946). See also Lattin,
op. cit. supra note 71, at 477-79; Stevens, Corporations 451 (1949).
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Act, such surplus would be available for share repurchases and might
effectively permit a "bail-out" of the shareholders of a faltering cor-
poration at the expense of creditors (who would receive only small
protection from the insolvency limitation) in any jurisdiction which
chose to follow the Randall decision.
The obverse of the asset write-up coin is capital write-down, or a
shrinking of assets on which creditors may depend to pay what is owing
to them. The situation is especially dangerous for creditors since cor-
porations in good financial circumstances (i.e., which have an unim-
paired capital and a substantial earned surplus) will not resort to such
techniques.
Under the Model Act, "reduction surplus," the result of a write-down
of stated capital, would also be available for share repurchases. The
Model Act, and the modern statutes influenced by it, are generous in
allowing a reduction of "stated capital" in any case by two-thirds vote
of the affected shareholders (sections 53 and 55), or even (under section
63) by mere majority shareholder vote, where the new stated capital
is not below the sum of the aggregate par value of all shares plus the
combined liquidation preferences of all shares having such rights.80
89. Such reduction of "stated capital" produces what modern statutes and writers refer
to as "reduction surplus," a form of capital surplus, and thus available under most modern
statutes for share repurchases. It is relatively easy for a modern corporation to reduce
its stated capital, with the consequent diminution in the asset fund reserved for the
creditors. In addition to automatic reduction through purchase or redemption of re-
deemable shares (Model Act § 61), voluntary reduction by retirement of other shares
(Model Act § 62), and distributions in partial liquidation (Model Act § 41), a corporation
may reduce the stated capital of no-par shares by majority vote of the voting shareholders
(Model Act § 63) or, even if par shares are involved, by two-thirds vote of the voting
shareholders of the corporation, plus two-thirds of the class affected (Model Act §§ 53(e),
54(c), 55(b)). Similar provisions for easy reduction of stated capital are found in the
statutes of all of the modern corporation states.
as to no-par as to other
capital capital
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-81 (Supp. 1958) - §§ 36-2A-71, 72, 73
Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 32 § 65 (1958) - §§ 54, 55, 56
D.C. Code Ann. tit. 29 § 61 (Supp. 1959) - §§ 52(e), 54(c), 55(b)
Md. Ann. Code art. 23 § 34 (1957) - H9 10(4), 11(c) (3), 42
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-48 (Supp. 1959) - §§ 55-99(b)(5), 55-100(b)(3)*
N.D. Rev. Code § 10-1970 (Supp. 1957) - §9 54(5), 55(3), 56(2)
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.406 (Supp. 1959) - 99 57.355(2) (e), 57.360(2),*
57.365 (2) (b)
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.12 (1953) - arts. 4.01B(5), 4.02A(3), 4.03
B(2)
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-64 (1950) - §§ 13.1-55(e), 13.1-56(c)
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.60 (1957) - §§ 180.50(2)(e), 180.51, 180.
52(1) (h)
* Only majority, rather than 2/3, vote required.
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Surplus thus created is expressly made "capital surplus" (under section
64), and is hence available for share repurchase.
Through use by a corporation of either of these techniques, creditors
may discover that what they justifiably considered to be capital has been
legally filtered off to their detriment for the benefit of shareholders.
While not sufficient to obviate these problems, at the very least credi-
tors should have the protection that no share purchases will be made if
the corporation is insolvent, or would be rendered so by the purchases, in
either the equity sense (as is required under the Model Act)"0 or in
the bankruptcy sense.91 This minimal requirement would seem essential
to creditors since a dying corporation may still be able to meet its obli-
gations as they fall due (i.e., be technically solvent in the equity sense),
although its assets are less than its total debts (insolvency in the bank-
ruptcy sense) f2 Such a requirement is "built-into" the Model Act, but
only in those cases where purchases are permitted solely from surplus,
Such ease of capital reduction is hardly unexpected in the face of the much more radical
provisions of the Model Act (§ 53) and the modern corporation statutes which even allow
the destruction of what lawyers used to call "vested rights" (a meaningless term, at least
in today's corporation law): the right of preferred shareholders to cumulative dividends
already due. See Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 283 (1958) (especially table of statutes at 293).
90. See notes 58 and So supra.
91. See note 19 supra.
92. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy fi 1.19, at 93 (14th d. 1956), suggests that the bankruptcy
insolvency test may postpone the day when a corporation must suspend its business to a
later date than does the equity insolvency test. It is submitted that this is often not the
case. A corporation may often be insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, and still able to meet
its debts as they mature, i.e., still solvent in the equity sense. See Note, 15 N.C.L. Rev.
199, 200-01 (1937). In Corey v. Wardsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 78, 11 So. 350, 353 (1892), the
court declared: "At what stage of a corporation's affairs must it be pronounced insolvent,
so as to bring it within the principle we have declared? It is not enough that its assets
are insufficient to meet all its liabilities if it be still prosecuting its line of business, with
the prospect and expectation of continuing to do so; in other words% if it be, in good faith,
what is sometimes called a 'going' business or establishment. Many successful corporate
enterprises, it is believed, have passed through crises, when their property and effect% if
brought to present sale, would not have discharged all their liabilities in full."
Thus it would seem clear that a corporation may be a "going concern" even though bank-
ruptcy insolvency is present. And it is precisely at this stage, just before inability to pay
its bills finally forces the house of cards to collapse, that the temptation to bail out favored
shareholders will be greatest. It is precisely at this juncture, therefore, that creditors
deserve the assurance that the assets to be ultimately split by them will not be diluted by
share repurchases.
See Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931) ; Nemmers,
The Power of a Corporation to Purchase Its Own Stock, 17 Wis. L. Rev. 161, 170 (1942),
demonstrating both that a corporation may be a going concern under the equity insolvency
test and still bankrupt, and also the judicially approved use of its waning aasets at this
critical time to bail out shareholders by stock repurchases. Creditors deserve better protec-
tion than this.
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and not in the extraordinary situations where purchases may be from
either surplus or capital. Creditors will indeed suffer if a corporation
can fritter away its liquid assets through legal share repurchases until
the "house of cards" finally collapses in bankruptcy. Fortunately, some
states have been foresighted enough to correct this Model Act de-
ficiency. 3
For truly adequate protection, a restriction on share repurchases
which retains the asset fund at a level higher than that barely necessary
to prevent bankruptcy is requisite. To forestall reduction of the assets
to this dangerous level, it is important to restrict such purchases to
surplus which has actually been earned, as opposed to allowing such
repurchases to be made from a "surplus" which is, in reality, partly (or
completely), diverted capital.
Authors usually speak of stated capital requirements as a protection
for creditors.94 They are also a protection for the shareholders. Their
effect is obviously to keep the asset fund at a level higher than that
which would otherwise be the case. As such, they prevent the dilution
of the real value95 of all shares. Asset disintegration through the
93. See note 80 supra, listing states imposing both insolvency restrictions. It should
be observed that an express addition of the bankruptcy insolvency test is not necessary
where purchases are to be made only from "surplus," as defined in § 2(k) of the Model
Act, since this test is already "built-in": surplus is the excess of net assets over stated
capital, while net assets are the assets (excluding treasury shares) less the debts of the cor-
poration. Therefore, even if stated capital be only nominal, there can be no surplus unless
the assets are sufficient to cover all corporate liabilities. See Baker & Cary, Cases on Cor-
porations 1025 (3d ed. abr. 1959). This is not true, however, for purchases permitted from
stated capital, since they are not expressly restricted to net assets. Unless so restricted, a
bankruptcy insolvency test is necessary to prevent dissipation of the asset fund through
such capital purchases. For simplicity of statutory expression, however, a blanket prohibi-
tion of purchases resulting in bankruptcy insolvency seems sensible.
It should also be observed that the bankruptcy insolvency test may not be a mere
redundancy even in the case of surplus purchases, since it requires a valuation of the assets
at current market value. This figure may be less than the figure at which these assets are
carried on the books. The "watered stock" case is a typical older example of such over-
valuation, (see, e.g., Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 692, 69 Atl.
1014 (Err. & App. 1908)), which resulted in the existence of an artificial surplus utilizable
for dividends and share repurchases to an extent which would not have been permitted
under a bankruptcy insolvency test. An asset writeup, as employed in Randall v. Bailey,
supra note 88, graphically illustrates the possibility of danger where only a surplus test
is used.
Although imposition of the bankruptcy insolvency test might not have prevented the
Randall fiasco because of the imprecision inherent in estimating market value, the require-
ment has the effect of increasing directorial caution by alerting them to the existence of
another ground of potential liability for share repurchases in cases of borderline propriety.
94. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 605; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 276. See,
however, Ballantine, supra at 570, 572.
95. The "book value," Ballantine, supra note 88, at 531, or the amount which would be
received on liquidation of the enterprise.
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subterfuge of artificial creation and distribution of capital surplus
is as detrimental to shareholders as it is to creditors, at least to those
who are not bought out. Hence, for the protection of both creditors and
shareholders, by and large, share repurchases should be limited to
actually earned surplus, and not surplus in general, as the Model Act
in effect allows.9
Shareholders also have grounds for disapproving unlimited purchases
even out of earned surplus. As Stevens points out, one objection is:
Modem accountants may take exception to this equation of book value with the real
value of stock. They may properly argue that no value based on a hypothetical liquida-
tion return is realistic; since if actual bankruptcy liquidation did occur the a.zets would
probably only bring a fraction (perhaps no more than a tenth) of the figure a"agned to
them as such liquidation value, and more important, that the real value of stock consists
in its earning power, rather than in any proportionate share of such possibly unliquiflable
corporate assets. This, of course, is merely saying that there are defects in any estimate
of value based on a balance sheet, which is really largely only a record of past expenditures.
Unfortunately, however, creditors and stockholders alike have as their only security the
retained assets of the corporation. The balance sheet may not reveal he exact value of
these assets, but it does at least ordinarily reflect their cost, and, especially in the case of
cash and receivables less debts, gives the most reliable indication of net worth which
accounting has yet provided.
While it may not always be true, (e.g., a corporation may have a high total aszet figure,
but too many unproductive assets carried at an inflated cost, and too few liquid assets)
a corporation with a high asset total is ordinarily better off than one with a lower level.
Certainly, even in a very profitable corporation, creditors and shareholders have more of a
prospective stake where the corporation has retained earnings, as revealed by a higher
asset level on the balance sheet. Generally, whatever keeps the corporate asset level high
is desirable from the point of view of creditors and shareholders.
96. A corporation's assets are like a housewife's measuring cup filled with flour. One
calibration on the cup is bankruptcy insolvency (an amount equal to the debts), (ideally)
a higher calibration is for stated capital, while (ideally) a still higher line marks the level
of assets necessary for these plus capital surplus. Only a foolish housewife would throw
away a part of her flour. Only a foolish shareholder would willingly deplete the aset
level of the corporation by gifts to others. Money once spent to repurchase shares is
"gone, and never must return," hence both senior and junior shareholders (always excepting
recipients of the money legally stolen from the remaining stockholders) have as much of
an objection as creditors not only to purchases from capital but also to purchasEs from a
fictitious surplus created out of capital. The sum total of the original money investment
of all of the shareholders is equal not to he total stated capital, but really to that sum
plus the total of capital surplus. Therefore, if original shareholders A and B each invest
$100 for a share in a newly formed corporation, the effect of allowing purchases from
other than actually earned surplus is to allow he corporation not only to fully repay B
his original investment for exercising his privilege of withdrawing from membership
(often more desirable to him than remaining in the corporation), but also to give him an
additional bonus taken from the remaining shareholder's (A's) investment. In short, part
of A's $100 is taken to make a gift to B. This "robbing Peter to pay Paul" is the ultimate
result of allowing share repurchases from other than surplus actually earned. Consequently,
not only creditors but all shareholders, senior and junior, have a clear interest in having
all share repurchases only made from earned surplus.
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[T]he agreement between them contemplates equal distribution of corporate losses
and equal distribution of corporate assets, after the satisfaction of creditors. A
shareholder may protest if the corporate purchase of the shares of another member
will have the effect of increasing the burden of corporate liability of those who
remain shareholders, for the fund applicable to corporate debts has been reduced
by the amount of the purchase price. The corollary of this is that the pro rata
share which each member will receive upon dissolution will be less than the amount
which has been paid to the member whose shares have been purchased. This
objection would be valid whether the purchase were made out of capital or out of
surplus. In other words, each shareholder has a right to insist that, if the shares
of any other member are purchased by the corporation, there will be a breach of the
contract between the members, unless the price paid does not exceed that amount
which the others would receive if the corporation were dissolved.9 7
Partial protection 8 to overcome this objection could be had by requir-
ing the corporation to make a pro rata offer to purchase to all share-
holders of the class at the same price. 9 Any "bonus" on the purchase
97. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 278. Also see Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88,
at 609.
98. Such a formula as Stevens suggests, payment of no more than liquidation value, might
be possible in the case of preferred shares, because the amount which they are to receive
on liquidation is often fixed by their shareholder contract (often at par). See, however,
Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 507-09, indicating that the liquidation value of even
such shares may be different from their call value. The Model Act, of course, does attempt
to do this in the case of redeemable shares (a term usually synonymous with preferred)
by fixing the call price as the maximum amount payable on repurchase. However, as to
common shares, this is either unworkable (e.g., at each purchase, good will would have to
be evaluated and going concern and asset value recomputed), or so onerous (if interpreted
to mean involuntary liquidation value, it would probably be so low as to effectively dis-
courage any shareholder from selling, except in an artificially deflated market) as to effec-
tively prevent all such repurchases. While Stevens' proposal would offer more complete
protection, it could not be considered as a feasible answer to the problem.
99. "Pro rata offer" here means "tender offer," whereby a corporation would offer to
repurchase, at a given price, a fixed proportion of each shareholder's shares in a company.
E.g., if there are 3000 outstanding shares in a corporation held by three shareholders, each
holding the shares indicated in the following table, and each share having a market price
of $10, the corporation might offer to repurchase as follows:
(c) (e)
Shares Voting Control
Which Held Subsequent
Will Be to Repurchase(b) Accepted (if each share-
Price By (d) holder sells all
(a) Offered by the Corp. Voting Control of the shares
Shares Corp. Per Under the Held Prior to indicated In
Shareholder Held Share Offer Repurchase column (c))
A 1000 $11 25% = 250 1000- =33 1/3% 750 = 33 1/3%
3000 2250
B 1500 $11 25% = 375 1500 = 50% 1125 = 50%
3000 2250
C 500 $11 25% = 125 500- =16 2/3% 375 = 16 2/3%
3000 2250
[Vol. 28
1959-60] SHARE REPURCHASES
price would result in the same equitable distribution of surplus as would
a dividend (at least to those electing to sell), even if the price paid is
over the market value (so long as the same price offer is made to each
member of the class to purchase his shares in the proportion held). As
long as his pro rata share of corporate surplus is distributed to him in
this way, no shareholder has grounds for complaint. An alternative,
where there were so many shares outstanding that a corporation could
not afford to take even a small percentage of each shareholder's stock,
or many very small holdings exist, necessitating fractional purchases,
might be the selection by lot of the shares to which repurchase offers
would be made. 0
The Model Act, of course, contains neither requirement of pro rata
offer nor selection by lot. Such provisions, however, while protecting a
shareholder from abuses in purchases from his own class, would still
allow a corporation to buy up its common stock, thus undermining the
equity of the preferred to the detriment of these shareholders.10'
If each shareholder sells the entire number of shares the corporation offers to take from
him, the effect is merely a partial liquidation, which will result in the same equitable
distribution of the corporation's surplus as a dividend, and also preserve the relative
voting position of each shareholder. Problems arise, however, if any of the shareholders
holds only 1 share, since then the offer to purchase would only be for 71 of a share in
the example given, and this would necessitate the undesirable issuance of fractional shares.
Similarly, if the security were traded on a securities exchange, "odd-lot' problems might
be created by ownership of small numbers of shares. (Shares on a stock exchange are
normally traded in lots of 100, or in the case of certain highly priced securities in lots
of 10. Other quantities are called "odd-lots" and create special trading problems.)
To obviate such difficulties, an alternative procedure, such as that permitted by the
New York Stock Exchange in redemptions, might be allowed: selection by lot of the
shareholders to whom repurchase offers would be made. The New York Stock Exchange
does not specify the manner in which drawing by lot should be conducted. The fairest
system (rather than one lot for each shareholder's name or each certificate number)
would seem to be one lot for each share of stock, identified, of course, as to ownership.
It should be observed that under a pro rata offer only those shareholders who elect to
sell to the corporation share in the "dividend." All unrepurchased shareholders obviously
not only fail to share but suffer diminution of the fund available for real dividends to
them. Moreover, the voting control remains the same only if each shareholder elects to
sell all of the shares the corporation offers to buy from him. Under lot selection both
dividend distribution and voting control are left to chance. For these reasons, approval
of the shareholders of the class to be repurchased seems an additional safeguard necessary
to the preservation of their rights. It should be further observed that under either system
all shareholders of whatever class, whose shares are not repurehased, suffer an obvious
decrease in the fund available for payment to them of real dividends. Hence, the approval
of all classes of shareholders should be required for purchases from any single group.
100. Offers to repurchase on a first-come-first-served basis are a third possible alterna-
tive. Yet, they are difficult to administer fairly where the shareholders are widely scattered
throughout the country, and require, as a result, too great statutory detail. They are
therefore an undesirable method for solving the problem. See New York Stock Exchange
Manual, note 58 supra, at A179-SO.
101. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 609, discussing the perils of share repurchases,
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Some protection here, at least to those who choose to read the articles
and not purchase preferred shares from corporations lacking such a
qualification, could be had by expressly allowing a corporation to place
any further restrictions (in addition to those contained in the corporation
statute) on the exercise of the power to repurchase in its articles of
incorporation, or even deny it altogether should it so choose. Such a
provision might, e.g., forbid purchases of common stock over the objec-
tion of any, or a specified percentage, of the preference shareholders.0"
Additional protection to these shareholders from harm through pur-
chases of junior shares would be given by adding the limitation found
in the North Carolina statute which forbids purchases "if at the time of
or as a result of such acquisitions:
"(3) The highest aggregate liquidation preference of the shares to
remain outstanding having prior or equal claims to the assets of the
corporation would exceed the net assets of the corporation, or
"(4) There exists any unpaid accrued dividends or dividend credits
with respect to any shares entitled to preferential dividends ahead of the
shares to be purchased .... ))103
A third method of protecting preferred shareholders would be to
require their approval, e.g., by two-thirds vote, of any purchases of
shares junior (or equal) to them in dividend or liquidation preference
before such purchases could be undertaken.
It should be observed that neither the Model Act nor any of its most
slavish followers extend any of these protections. 104 While all would
observes: "They may be so used as to undermine the equity or margin of safety back of
preferred shares, decrease assets and surplus and so defeat the reasonable expectations of
preferred shareholders as to future dividends and also those in arrears." See also Hills,
Model Corporation Act, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1334, 1371 n.62 (1935).
102. It is not clear under Model Act § 48(f) (i) and the last sentence, whether such a
limitation would be effective. Such a charter provision gives only illusory protection
unless it is made clear that the vote of the affected shareholders will be required for any
charter amendment. Section 55(e) of the Model Act would have to be amended to make
it certain that such a charter amendment would be construed as constituting a change in
the "designations, preferences, limitations or relative rights" of these shares.
103. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-52(e)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1959). Interestingly enough, the
Model Act itself contains similar provisions (§ 41(c)-(d)) but restricts their ambit to
distributions in partial liquidation of the corporation. It also forbids purchase of redeem-
able shares which would reduce the net assets below the aggregate preferential amount
payable to the holders of shares having prior or equal rights on liquidation. Since most
preferred shares are redeemable, Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 509, the section at
most protects preferred shareholders from purchases of other preferred shares. No protec-
tion is afforded the preferred shareholders from purchases of "common" shares, certainly
as great a danger to them.
104. See, however, Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03A (1953), which makes all repurchases
subject to charter prohibition, and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.385(c) (1957), making purchases
from other than earned surplus subject to charter approval or vote of "at least two-thirds
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be indicated to give complete safety to senior securities from discrimi-
nating repurchases of junior shares, no statute can be said to offer even
minimal financial safeguards without at least one of the above protective
provisos. Junior shareholders, of course, themselves require for their owm
protection the fair treatment guaranteed by pro rata offer.
One might add that to protect members of the class being repurchased
in any case where neither pro rata offer nor lot selection is required, or if
permission to use other than earned surplus is retained, the statute should
also require shareholder approval not only by superior classes, but also
by the class to be repurchased itself, whether that class be ordinarily
entitled to vote or not (as is usually true with senior shares, barring
dividend defaults).
Otherwise, holders of a controlling block of common could divert all
the corporate surplus to their own shares, however few, of a non-voting
preferred. Furthermore, purchase of shares senior to their own offers a
possibility of damage to all shares junior to those purchased. Many
people, judges included,105 apparently forget that "what's gone is gone."
Money spent for senior shares is that much less for junior shares in
dividends or liquidation value, and this is true despite bookkeeping
entries to the contrary. The protection of junior shareholders not only
demands pro rata or by lot offers to buy where purchases are to be made
from their own class, but also requires their approval of all purchases
from classes senior to them, since whatever goes to these senior share-
holders means correspondingly less will go to them.
In addition to these deficiencies in financial protection offered to all
shareholders under the Model Act and its modern followers, there is a
further objection to these statutes rendering them especially unsatisfac-
tory to the junior (voting) shareholders whose shares are the subject
of repurchase. Stevens, writing with prescience before the appearance of
the Model Act and its modern counterparts, thus phrased the objection:
The purchase by a corporation of its own shares may have an effect upon the
voting power of the remaining shareholders and be objectionable to them on that
score. It has been decided that the corporation's acquisition of its own shares does
not automatically effect a merger or a cancellation of the shares. The shares may be
canceled, but, unless intentionally canceled, they remain divisible share interests
which may be resold. Nevertheless, while the corporation holds its own shares,
they may not be voted, and, by thus reducing the total number of votes which may
of the outstanding shares of the same class and of each class entitled to equal or prior
rank in the distribution of assets in the event of voluntary liquidation."
105. Treasury shares are mere pieces of paper, having no more value than authorized
but unissued shares. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 614-18. Yet some accountants
have treated them as corporate assets, and have even been upheld by some American courts
in doing so. Id. at 616-18. See also Hills, Statement of Legal Concepts of Accounting, 36
Iowa L. Rev. 198, 214-19 (1951); Nemmers, The Power of a Corporation to Purchase Its
Own Stock, 17 Wis. L. Rev. 161, 183-84 (1942).
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be cast at a shareholders' meeting, the number of votes required to constitute a
majority is less than before the purchase. Consequenty, a group who held 49 per
cent of an outstanding total of 100 shares will control 51 per cent of the voting
power if the corporation purchases and holds 4 of the outstanding 100 shares. Again,
from the standpoint of the shareholder objecting on this ground, it will make no
difference whether the purchase be made out of capital or surplus. His objection
in this instance is not the fundamental one that the corporation lacks authority to
acquire its own shares, but rather that the directors or the majority shareholders are
using their power to work a fraud upon him.' 06
The suggested requirement of pro rata offer insures that relative
voting position will be maintained even when voting shares are being
purchased, at least if all shareholders accept the offer.' 07 To overcome
the necessity for pro rata offer (pro rata purchase such as is required
by section 55-52 (c) (1) of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act
is impractical since refusal of any shareholder to sell would defeat the
entire purchase plan), an alternative requirement of two-thirds share-
holder approval by the class to be purchased is probably high enough to
prevent imposition in most cases.'08 However, this dispensation should
be limited.
106. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 279-80.
107. See note 99 supra. As to pro rata offer, see Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corpora-
tion of Its Own Stock, 35 Col. L. Rev. 971, 1003 (1935) ; Nemmers, op. cit. supra note 105,
at 175.
108. Presumably shareholders will not vote to disenfranchise themselves by a transfer of
voting control, except under the most compelling circumstances. Such a requirement of
course only protects such voting shareholders from such practical disenfranchisement, and
not from other abuses. It is even possible to derive a formula for taking over a corporation
with its own money (i.e., the stockholders' money). The formula for shares required to be
purchased by the corporation to secure control with any number of shares is:
px-M
(1) z - , where x equals the total number of shares outstanding; z equals the
p
number to be bought by the corporation; p equals percentage necessary for control, and M
equals shares already secured to management.
By contrast, if the individual directors sought to secure the same control through pur-
chases of shares with their own money, the formula would be: (2) z ' = px-M. A
share bought by the corporation with its money is therefore worth "p" times as much as
a share bought by the directors on their own account. Although more shares must there-
fore be bought in the corporation's name than would be required if the individuals bought
for themselves, such control may be purchased for themselves without any expenditure of
their own money. Wise purchases partly on their individual, and partly on the corporation's
account, may be employed to secure control and also maximize their individual share
participation as far as resources allow. The shares to be purchased by the corporation when
the directors' individual resources are exhausted can be easily computed by taking the
amount needed under formula 2, subtracting the number of shares the directors can
afford for themselves, and dividing z ' by p. For example, if there are 100,000 (x) shares
outstanding, and management, certain of 40,000 (M) of them, can afford to purchase
10,000 in its own right, and need 2/3 approval for liquidation, it may insure the acceptance
of the plan by use of the corporation's surplus to purchase 25,000 shares of the remaining
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The Model Act and most modern statutes, devoid of both safeguards,
leave the danger unremedied.
Purchases of senior shares may be used to divert surplus otherwise
available for dividends to junior shares to such preference issues. Pur-
chases of junior stocks may dissipate surplus even below that necessary
to assure payment of the fixed dividend preferences of senior issues.
Consequently, the only safe provision is to require purchases of shares
of any class to be approved by all classes whether normally voting or
non-voting.10 9
Under section 61 of the Model Act only redeemable shares are auto-
matically cancelled by repurchase. Other shares"' may be resold by
the corporation as it pleases."' Therefore, not only may management
50,000 shares. The advantage here is patent. If the corporation has an initial surplus of
$1,000,000, and can acquire needed shares for $1 each, the directors will make an additional
$30,000 on the 10,000 shares purchased for themselves over what they would have received
on those same shares had the repurchase of the 25,000 shares not been made by the corpora-
tion ($130,000 as opposed to $100,000).
109. An alternative designed to achieve this protection is found in some modern statutes.
E.g., Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.03(C) (1953) provides: "Upon resolution of its board of
directors authorizing the purchase and upon compliance with any other requirements of
its articles of incorporation, a corporation may purchase its own shares to the extent of
unrestricted earned surplus available therefor if accrued cumulative preferential dividends
and other current preferential dividends have been fully paid at the time of purchase." See
also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52 (Supp. 1959). Shareholder approval by all classes (as recom-
mended) is also required, but only for repurchases out of capital surplus. Tex. Bus. Corp.
Act art. 2.03(D) (1953); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-52(C) (Supp. 1959). Also note
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.385 (1957), which provides for repurchases where: "(b) The net assets
of the corporation remaining after such acquisition would be not less than the aggregate
preferential amount payable in the event of voluntary liquidation to the holders of shares
having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in the event of liquidation; and
(c) Such acquisition is authorized by the articles of incorporation or by the affirmative vote
or the written consent of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the
same class and of each class entitled to equal or prior rank in the distribution of assets in
the event of voluntary liquidation." See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.35(A)(9) (Page
Supp. 1959).
110. According to Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 490-91, there are no preemptive
rights in treasury shares. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note SS, at 500S, 511. N.Y. Stock
Corp. Law § 39(4) (c) expressly denies such preemptive rights unless the certificate provides
otherwise. In Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265, N.Y.S. 172 (2d Dep't 1933), which
antedated the statute, the court held that preemptive rights may exist in treasury shares
under some circumstances. See Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71, at 426; Note, The Preemptive
Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Stock, 11 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 78 (1933). N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 55-56(b) (Supp. 1959) expressly grants such preemptive rights except where limited
by the articles of incorporation (§ 55-7(4) (f)).
111. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 614; Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 93, at
849. Under the Model Act, besides the dangers here outlined, the possibilities for "stock
watering," as a result of the corporation's right to sell such shares at market, as opposed to
par, are obvious. Donations or repurchases of shares issued in exchange for overvalued
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manipulate control in the way Stevens suggests, but it can transfer that
control to its own members, or their friends, as individuals, by carefully
planned bargain sales. The effect not only perpetuates management in
power, but gives its members equal dividend and liquidation participation
at nominal cost with those shareholders who have paid full value for
their shares. Under such statutes the normal rule that directors are
uncompensated for their "services""' 2 to the corporation may well become
a travesty.
Resale of treasury shares should therefore require the same share-
holder approval as their repurchase, or, at least, the statute should grant
preemptive rights" 3 in their resale. It is to be noted that neither method
will be effective if the original purchases have caused the shift in the
balance of corporate power against which Stevens cautioned, since they
may do nothing to rectify that shift. This danger merely serves to
emphasize the necessity for pro rata offer and shareholder approval on
the original repurchase.
V. POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS
From the foregoing discussion, one may conclude that a statute offer-
ing minimal protection to creditors and shareholders of a corporation
would: (1) never permit share repurchases out of capital, except to
pay the appraisal value of shares to stockholders entitled to receive such
payment; and where the shares were reacquired in compromise of an
indebtedness due to the corporation, with the further limitation that
even such reacquisitions must be in good faith; (2) that, with such
exceptions, only earned surplus" 4 be allowed for share reacquisitions, and
"property" sold to the corporation enable the corporation to resell these shares to "suckers"
at a bargain price of less than par-but still over true value. See Ballantine, op. cit. supra
at 617. Section 23 of the Model Act is so drawn as to afford little protection against Issu-
ance of such watered shares. In fact it seems to legislate the New York common law rule
that holders of watered stock are under no liability to pay the par of their shares If their
agreement with the corporation is otherwise. Christensen v. Eno, 106 N.Y. 97, 12 N.E. 648
(1887); Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y. 293, 98 N.E. 490 (1912). Model Act § 24 allows
a corporation to deny preemptive rights to purchase treasury shares. Ballantine, op. cit.
supra, at 617, suggests that reacquired shares be restored to the status of authorized
and unissued shares. This might well not give preemptive rights on their resale. Id. at
489. See also Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71, at 426.
112. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 753; Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 187.
113. The doctrine of preemptive right and pro rata offer are both facets of a similar
policy of protecting shareholders from dilution of the asset and voting value of their shares,
and are thus natural complemefits.
114. I.e., "actually" earned surplus, as defined note 58 supra. Restricting purchases to
actually earned surplus has the advantage of lessening the utility of capital reduction,
over-allocation of no-par consideration to surplus, and asset write-ups. For if the "surplus"
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that even repurchases from this surplus be required to be by pro rata
offer, or by lot, with any resales of uncancelled shares carrying pre-
emptive rights; (3) that repurchase and resale require express share-
holder approval, at the time of such repurchase, 115 by two-thirds vote,'
not only of the class to be repurchased, but also of all classes senior and
junior thereto, regardless of voting rights; (4) that no reacquisition be
made when the corporation is, or would be rendered, insolvent in either
the equity or bankruptcy sense.
The question naturally presents itself as to what exceptions, if any,
are to be allowed from the strict limitations suggested.
As was indicated above, contracts requiring the corporation to repur-
chase shares are not uncommon in three different situations: (1) as part
of an original share subscription contract, (2) where the shares are
issued as part of an employee incentive plan, (3) in a "close" corpora-
tion to insure that on the retirement or death of one of the participants
the corporation will remain "close," i.e., that the remaining "partners"
may control entry of the replacement into the enterprise.
Ballantine is especially severe on the first type of contract, despite its
general judicial acceptance:
There has been a good deal of recognition of the validity of agreements, made as
part of a subscription to shares, to repurchase them on the demand of the subscriber
if the subscriber becomes dissatisfied with his investment. Such repurchase agree-
ments are generally part of some stock selling scheme by high pressure salesmen.
Some courts have even made a judicial exception in favor of this practice under
statutes restricting withdrawal of 'capital stock' or forbidding purchases except out
of surplus. Specious reasons have been assigned to explain the upholding of such
escape provisions, as that the transaction is only a conditional sale or a 'sale and
return contract,' and that the corporation cannot retain the subscription price and
at the same time repudiate the illegal agreement to repurchase. This is even carried
so far as to validate an agreement to pay a premium on repurchase and to pay
thus created cannot be used for share repurchases (and dividend payments), it becomes
less desirable for the corporation to circumvent the stated capital limitation by such tech-
niques. The effect is thus a protection of creditors, and the body of unrepurchased share-
holders, from diminution of their asset fund.
115. To prevent imposition on subsequent innocent (i.e., unsophisticated) share pur-
chasers who will not normally read the charter nor the by-laws or minutes p-sed by the
incorporators.
116. Such a high requirement would not seem undemocratic. It is, after all, the pas-
centage required for constitutional amendments and legislative overriding of pre-Idential
or gubernatorial vetoes. Furthermore, a corporation is really a plutocracy in which one
individual may carry much greater voting power than he would in a political election.
Hence he has a correspondingly greater power to inflict harm on minority shareholder-s
Despite the understandably greater voting power due to greater financial stahe in the
corporation, the proportionately greater danger of imposition seems to justify the high
vote requirement utilized even in a political democracy.
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interest as part of the purchase price, obviously illegal. Such agreements, used to
entice reluctant and inexperienced subscribers, should be condemned as dangerous to
creditors and unfair and discriminatory as against other shareholders even if creditors
are not immediately threatened."7
The pernicious nature of such agreements, often unknown to other
unfavored shareholders, should be sufficiently obvious. They allow
selected shareholders of a financially shaky corporation to escape with
their entire investment intact at any time before insolvency. This is
palpably unfair to the other shareholders, to say nothing of creditors.
Even were repurchase to be at a price no higher than the shareholder's
liquidation proportion of the assets, and paid completely from surplus,
the repurchase would be objectionable as a device for manipulating voting
control.
When recourse to such agreements must be had, e.g., if no other means
of raising money for the corporation is available, they should only be
permitted with full knowledge and two-thirds approval of the share-
holders."' No exception should be made for such purchases, except
from the requirement of pro rata offer.
117. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 613-14. (Emphasis added.) Stevens, op. cit.
supra note 88, at 283, states that such repurchase agreements are generally upheld when
repayment can be made out of surplus.
118. This choice should be made by the actual investors in the corporation, not by
dummy incorporators or subscribers, who have no financial interest in the corporation, and
hence no qualms about committing it to a policy basically unfair to later shareholders. The
approval of these repurchase agreements should be postponed until the corporation Is really
under way, i.e., in the control of the actual owners of the enterprise, who stand to be
harmed by such agreements. On the other hand, the unavailability of such devices in the
promotional stage of the corporation may well prevent successful exploitation of new, and
socially desirable, inventions for want of the availability of more conservative financing.
The value decision which must be made here is difficult, involving a weighing of the social
interest against that of the individual shareholders and creditors of the enterprise. These
interests conflict since if any shareholder is allowed to withdraw, the corresponding debt
burden of the remaining shareholders is pro tanto increased and the total fund for creditors
diminished. An appropriate adjustment would subject all shareholders to the same perils
during the most crucial period of corporate life, its inception, but allow those whose
initial contribution is so valuable to their fellow shareholders, as to justify special treat-
ment, to stand in a position between that of shareholder and real creditor after this initial
crisis has passed. This can be accomplished by allowing the shareholders (who by this time
will be the actual investors in the corporation) to agree by suitable vote, e.g., two-thirds
of all classes, to such a repurchase agreement after a sufficient period has elapsed since
incorporation, say, one year, to insure that those with the real financial stake in the corpora-
tion will accept the consequences. Financiers will, of course, be forced during the formation
period to choose between a genuine creditor status and the risk of gain or loss consequent
upon genuine shareholder status. They may "hedge" (and if their participation is truly
vital they will be given this additional advantage by the incorporators) by insisting upon
options to purchase shares which might be made redeemable on the holder's election if the
shareholders gave the requisite approval at the later date suggested.
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Moreover, case law in some states has created another strange and
hidden danger to creditors and shareholders by allowing shareholders
who have been given notes for their repurchased shares to come in as
general creditors on an insolvency distribution.10 Even though share-
holders who have been completely repurchased in a bona fide transaction
may fairly be said to take priority over the corporate shareholders on
such an insolvency distribution, the danger of abuses would seem to
dictate that their claims be subordinated to those of general creditors.="
Yet another defect of the Model Act is its silence regarding repurchase
agreements, and its failure to fix clearly the time for application of the
insolvency test. If the test is to be applied at the time of the contract,
the corporation will usually be solvent, and the transaction, therefore,
permissible. If applied when the shareholder elects to enforce his rights
to sell, or be paid, the opposite may well be true. Clever shareholders
may thus be able to secure for themselves all the benefits of shareholders
if the business prospers, while at the same time possessing all the safe-
guards of creditors if the business fails.
The 1957 revision of the Model Act, apparently designed to cor-
rect this ambiguity, now forbids not only purchase of, but also payment
for, its shares when the corporation is or would be rendered insolvent by
such "repurchase or payment." Nonetheless, the ambiguity remains.
How, for example, is an agreement to repurchase made while the corpora-
tion is solvent, but payable by notes some of which mature after in-
solvency has occurred, to be treated? Is the noteholder to be denied all
participation even with that of shareholders? Must all earlier payments
be refunded? The answer would be to subordinate these claims to those
of general creditors, but allow them priority over unrepurchased share-
holders. Such persons are centaurs: half creditor, half shareholder. It
is only appropriate to treat them as such, unambiguously.
Agreements to repurchase shares, therefore, should be accorded special
treatment. Yet, instead of special exceptions in their favor, such re-
purchases should be subjected to an additional limitation, namely, that
for the insolvency test the time of enforcement of the contract will
control, and that if the shares have already been surrendered and a
corporate obligation given, the obligation will be subordinated to the
rights of general creditors on such insolvency.'
119. See, e.g., Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 NJ. Eq. 34, 163 AtL 140 (Chan.
1932); Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931); see
also Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 284-86. The better rule is to subordinate such claims
to those of general creditors. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 286, and cases cited
therein; Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Sub-
stantive Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 697, 703-04 (1941).
120. Some cases have so held. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 8, at 286 n.53.
121. The 1953 revision of the Model Act made no attempt whatsoever to deal with this
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Furthermore, the requisite shareholder approval should be given a
sufficient time after the corporation has actually commenced business
to prevent "dummy" ratification by technical shareholders often used
to effect incorporation for those really interested. 2'
The second and third types of repurchase contracts seem, in general,
more justifiable. Employee purchase of shares at a discount does stimu-
late better efforts in behalf of the corporation,2 3 but this advantage
ceases when the employment terminates, and prudent management there-
fore requires the departing employee to surrender his shares and rights to
purchase shares. A pro rata offer should not be required on such repur-
chases, and the original authorization for the employee's incentive plan12 4
should be sufficient if it contains the repurchase provision. The same
dangers inhere in the incentive share plan as in any contract to repur-
problem. Section 5 merely provided: "No purchase of its share shall be made at a time
when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase would render the corporation
insolvent." Unfortunately, this old Model Act provision has been adopted verbatim by at
least one state, Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-13 (Supp. 1958). See the similarly In-
adequate provisions of D.C. Code Ann. § 29-904a (Supp. 1959); N.D. Rev. Code § 10-1905
(Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 57.035, 57.390 (Supp. 1957); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art.
2.03 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-4 (1950); and the ambiguous provisions of Md. Ann.
Code art. 23, § 32 (1957), and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.385 (1957).
122. Preferred shares granting the holder the option to demand redemption are of the
same genre and equally pernicious. See Dodd, supra note 119, at 730-34. Objectors to this
stringent requirement may argue that money will thus become unavailable for worthwhile
enterprises pioneered by the "idea" men who have little cash of their own. The difficulty
can be solved. Lenders to the corporation have the rights of creditors. If the financier
requires additional inducement, he may always extract from the individual shareholders
initiating the enterprise an option allowing him to purchase a portion of their individual
shares which is exercisable by him at a time sufficiently removed from inception so that
the corporation will show either promise of becoming successful or the opposite. Such an
arrangement may give rise to a (successful) objection on insolvency by creditors that the
financier was a shareholder, and hence not entitled to equal treatment with them. But It
would be no worse for the financier in this regard than an initial share repurchase agree-
ment, and the arrangement would protect the shareholders of a solvent corporation from
possible deviation of their surplus to one favored shareholder in a period of secular decline.
See note 118 supra.
123. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 427-28; Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88,
at 606, as to such employee share plans. Share incentive plans are even recognized by the
tax law and accorded special treatment. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 421. As to the advis-
ability of distinguishing between employee and other share repurchase agreements, see
Dodd, op. cit. supra note 119, at 712-17.
124. Such advance shareholder authorization is often required. See, e.g., D.C. Code
Ann. tit. 29, § 23 (Supp. 1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-45 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. Stock Corp.
Law § 14. Texas, on the other hand, grants the power without express shareholder au-
thorization. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.02(17) (1953).
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chase. Yet, where circumscribed by the same limits, i.e., two-thirds
shareholder approval, the plan should be even less objectionable. If
repurchase terms are initially authorized by the requisite shareholder
approval, no express authorization should be required on actual repur-
chase at market value,a 5 provided that the corporation be solvent
immediately after the authorization of the plan, and that, the actual
reacquisitions are made when the corporation is solvent, or, at least,
the employee should be subordinated in rights to other creditors, regard-
less of the form of the transaction.126
Similar considerations would seem to justify agreements to repurchase
by a close corporation from earned surplus. Shareholder agreements
should be drawn here to give the corporation an option to repurchase.'12
The corporation may assure itself of sufficient surplus to exercise this
option on the death of a participant by appropriate insurance policies.
In other situations, the corporation should be allowed to repurchase,
but only with the requisite shareholder approval of the corporation's
participation in such an initial shareholder agreement, and out of earned
surplus.2 Stockholder agreements should provide for purchase by indi-
vidual shareholders (pro rata) if the corporation is unable to exercise
the option in such circumstances. Where all the shareholders are parties
to a restrictive shareholder agreement, and the corporation assents,
however, it would seem an unnecessary formality to require separate
shareholder approval at the actual time of repurchase.
Thus, with the above qualifications indicated, no special exceptions
need be granted for corporate contracts to repurchase shares.
Generally speaking, no special exception is needed to buy out recald-
trants. If they are merely obstructionists, it should be easy to secure the
requisite two-thirds shareholder approval authorizing repurchase of their
125. Or, as every prudent corporation will require, at some amount below market. A
pro rata offer should not be required for such repurchase.
126. I.e., even though the "repurchase" may have been made before technical insolvency,
and notes given which are sought to be enforced after such insolvency has taken place.
Such a plan prefers such employee shareholders over other shareholders of the corporation.
Since "employees" may include officers, directors and large shareholders, Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933), were such employees given parity with general creditors,
a loophole for selective favoritism of certain shareholders over creditors, through equal
participation with them, would be created similar to that possible with repurchase
agreements as a part of share subscriptions. The possible benefit of such plans to the
corporation (creditors and fellow shareholders) would seem, however, to justify at least
a priority over remaining shareholders once the obligation to repurchase has matured.
127. See notes 33 and 34 supra.
128. Of course, if all shareholders and creditors approve any transaction, it rhould be
allowed. Once shareholders and creditors consent, there can be no objection (provided
future creditors and shareholders have notice) even to purchases from capital.
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shares. Of course as with the previous "exceptions" considered, pro
rata offer would here seem inappropriate.
Any over-all grant to repurchase shares of obstructionists would,
naturally, be open to extensive abuses, as would an unqualified grant to
purchase shares to prevent the takeover of a corporation by prospective
looters:129 too many persons could fit themselves into the appropriate
categories should the opportunity present itself.
With regard to purchases to "make a market" for new corporation
issues, Stevens raises the following objection, which, incidentally, he
does not regard as sufficiently dangerous in itself to justify an absolute
prohibition:
Trafficking in corporate shares has another aspect. It has been suggested that
'dealings by a company in its own shares tend inevitably to breaches of duty on the
part of the directors, and to fraud and rigging the market on the part both of the
corporation itself and of its officials.' The legal and ethical aspect of a director's
conduct when, with inside information as to corporate plans and prospects, he pur-
chases or sells shares in his own corporation, has been considered elsewhere. The
situation is analogous when the purchase or sale is made by the corporation itself,
for it is made at the instance of the directors or officers, who possess information
not shared by other members, and whose motive in making the purchase or the sale
is the profit or advantage which the corporation will gain, even at the expense of the
individual from whom shares are bought or to whom shares are sold.130
"Market rigging'1131 is already restricted by the rules of the SEC.
Limited corporate purchases within federal and stock exchange regula-
tions may be desirable. Still, a general exception for corporate specula-
tion in its own shares is very dangerous. Management's activities should
be directed to the improvement of the corporation's legitimate business,
and any general exception for such speculation would, if not inevitably
result in a breach of director's duties and market rigging, at least
constitute an undesirable distraction from their obligation to further the
corporation's business. Should any further warning be necessary, though,
one might recall the South Sea Company's speculation in its own shares
129. As to repurchases for this purpose, see Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 93, at 597.
Quaere: if directors would not have a fiduciary duty to repurchase shares for the corpora-
tion to prevent takeover by prospective looters, if the repurchase could be made legally.
See Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 88, at 609-10, 621-24.
130. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 88, at 280. Stevens terms such activity an ultra
vires risk not contemplated in the articles of incorporation. Under modern corporation
laws which expressly grant the power to repurchase shares, this objection seems no longer
tenable.
131. See Nussbaum, supra note 107, at 986. As has been observed, see notes 37 and 38
supra, "stabilizing" purchases are not forbidden, however, and it is often difficult to draw
the line. Nemmers, supra note 108, at 166, approves purchases to support the market.
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which contributed that infamous chapter of corporation law known as
the "South Sea Bubble."' 3 2
Even with the additional safeguard that insiders' short-swing profits
on such speculations (if corporate purchases are used to elevate the
market, shareholders controlling such purchases are able to profit by
timely sales of their individual shares) are recoverable by the corpora-
tion under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 such
purchases would not seem worthy of encouragement by special favoritism
because of their inherent dangers.
Nevertheless, a concession may be made to accommodate legitimate
purchases, including all of the above, to an extent not overly dangerous.
Limited purchases from earned surplus without pro rata offer and two-
thirds shareholder approval for each transaction might be permitted by
appropriate charter provision, or better by a blanket grant given a
sufficient time after organization, to obviate mere "dummy" approval,
by two-thirds of the shareholders. Since such purchases, albeit limited,
always diminish the amount available for dividends to the remaining
shareholders and may shift a closely divided voting control, they should
never exceed a small percentage of the outstanding shares. Permitting
a corporation to hold at no time more than five per cent' of its out-
132. Benjamin, The South Sea Bubble 114 (1921). As to the techniques used by the
South Sea Company, see Lunt, History of England 509-10 (3d ed. 1946).
133. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958). See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Cook & Freedman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 412 (1953).
134. This figure would certainly seem high enough for any legitimate purchases.
E.g., Rule U-42(b)(5), (6), promulgated under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 83 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1958), allows share acquisitions
by holding companies regulated thereunder up to 2%,'o of their stock or $500 in value.
This percentage is likewise much higher than is needed for legitimate stabilizing activities.
The underwriters in the Fedders-Quiggan Corporation (now Fedders Corp.) 1951 rights
offering, one of the most unsuccessful of such attempts to market new securities in recent
New York Stock Exchange history, were only forced to buy 2200 shares of the common
stock out of 1,240,820 in their attempt to make a market for the new offering. See Supp.,
Nov. 26, 1951, to Prospectus, Nov. 9, 1951.
Corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are required under the current
listing agreement to report all acquisitions and dispositions of their own shares to the
Exchange. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual § 1(7), at A-24. Out of
about 1100 different businesses listed on the Exchange, comparatively few do any dealing
in their own shares. In the February 18, 1959, published report of changes in the number of
reacquired shares held by listed companies as treasury stock, only 30 companies reported a
net increase in the number of their own shares held, and only 45 reported any transactions
in their shares, even though for 20 of the corporations reporting the period covered was
three months (for the remaining 25 the report was of charges during the preceding
month). Of these, 19 reported a balance of treasury shares on hand of over S ,¢o. However,
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standing shares would seem a maximum generosity to possibly legitimate
repurchases, considering the dangers which all repurchases, even out of
earned surplus, produce to shareholders. Despite the uncertainty of such
a criterion, 3 5 such purchases should probably be made subject to a
requirement of good faith. Such a proviso will give courts the additional
leeway necessary to set aside or enjoin purchases envisaged by manage-
ment for any improper purpose which render the general restrictions
advisable.
only 10 companies reporting changes in their holdings of treasury stock ended up with
more than 5 % of their common at the end of this period. Ten companies reporting hcld
more than 5% of both their preferred and common. Such reports are not cumulative
as to holdings of treasury stock, i.e., they only reflect changes in the number of shares
held and balance during the reporting period, and, therefore, do not include such astounding
share repurchases as those of American-Hawaiian Steamship Company which, by reacquisl-
tion of its common stock, reduced its number of shareholders to (it was believed by the
Exchange) only 125 (discounting odd lots), despite an outstanding common as of April 2,
1959, of 500,000 shares (Fitch's Stock Quotations on the N.Y. Stock Exchange, April 2,
1959, p. 2). N.Y. Stock Exch. News Release, March 26, 1959. Nor do the figures include
shareholdings of such companies as Crescent Petroleum Corporation, which reported no
change in its holdings of treasury stock, but as of January 13, 1959, held 1,123,864 out of
2,733,800 of its common shares in treasury. Report to N.Y. Stock Exch., Jan. 5, 1959, of
no. of shares in treasury on Dec. 31, 1958. Probably corporations engaging in such ex-
tensive share repurchases are in the minority. The report would indicate that, although
those which do deal actively in their own securities may do so with a vengeance, there are
very few corporations which attempt such trafficking in their own shares.
Yet, the statistics do indicate that perhaps too much faith has been placed in the SEC and
the New York Stock Exchange rules as foreclosing the possibility of a corporation's
trading in its own shares, and that greater regulation by state incorporation laws is advisable.
There would appear to be no valid reason for corporations to hold as many shares in
their treasuries as this minority of corporations does. There is, of course, good reason
for reacquisition of preferred stock, to free common stock from the dividend burden
such stock entails. However, if such shares are reacquired for this legitimate purpose, they
should be retired, rather than carried in the treasury. There would seem to be even
less reason (unless to perpetrate one of the abuses cautioned against) for large treasury
holdings of common stock.
In any event, if large numbers of shares are to be reacqured for some worthwhile
purpose, such as to be available for an employee stock option plan, or acquisition of another
corporation, this may be done under express authorization suggested elsewhere, and an un-
limited right to reacquire and hold 5% of its shares of each class should certainly be ample
for every other worthwhile purpose.
135. Nussbaum, supra note 107, at 982-83, argues that the "good faith" test
has been ineffective to prevent abuses. The test at least supplies judges desirous of
engrafting traditional fiduciary limitations onto the power of share reacquisition with
a statutory justification for doing so. For a similar technique to prevent abuses which no
statute can ever completely foresee and restrict, see the Uniform Commercial Code
1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." See note 64 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Most legal writers who have examined the problem of a corporation's
repurchase of its own shares have condemned the generally permissive
American rule.13 Perhaps they still hope, with Milton, that "time will
run back and fetch the age of gold": the strict rule prevailing in England
and other countries.137 In the face of the almost universal permission
accorded by American law to some form of corporate share repurchases,
and the ever more sweeping grant given by modern corporation statutes,
led by the Model Act, such expectation is too sanguine, at least until
America suffers a South Sea Bubble, or an economic crisis like that
experienced by Germany after World War I.'1s Until such unwelcome
disasters, critics of unrestricted corporate share purchases will remain
unheeded voices crying in the wilderness.
As was suggested at the outset of this article, perhaps things are as
they should be. Certainly, the two principles originally presupposed are
valid-democratic government is based on them-adequately established
popular approval should be binding on the entire group, including dis-
senters, and an individual should be bound by a choice rationally made
(i.e., with awareness of the possible consequences, or, what is the same
thing, the reasonable possibility of such awareness).
It was submitted, as a conclusion from these premises, that share-
holders and corporate creditors could legitimately be held to those risks
involved in purchasing shares from, or extending credit to, a corporation,
where fair notice was had of the dangers involved. Unfortunately, under
the Model Act and the statutes which follow it, the only choice given to
the individual investor or creditor consists of taking an almost complete
risk-casting caution to the winds-or of not dealing with a corporation
at all.
It is, however, also submitted that no legislature in the country intends
to allow share repurchases by a corporation which would be unjust to
creditors and fellow shareholders. Whether or not creditors do in fact
rely on the "capital" of a corporation, they should have the right to rely
on a certain minimal asset fund available for the satisfaction of their
debts: a legal limit below which they are sure a corporation shall not go.
A general requirement, with as few exceptions as possible, that capital
remain unimpaired lends some protection in insuring the existence of
such a minimal asset fund. Nevertheless, unless modern corporation
statutes are revised to make this stated capital more inviolable, or the
136. Nussbaum, supra note 107, at 978.
137. Id. at 976-77.
138. Id. at 972-75.
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"surplus" created therefrom less available for indiscriminate corporate
use, it is alone insufficient protection for these creditors. The capital
may be diminished below a level equal to outstanding debts, since it
bears no necessary relation to them. 39
Imposition of the bankruptcy test for insolvency, apart from other
restrictions, might give a minimal asset protection to creditors, for
capital would not be dissipated through share repurchases below a level
equal to what is owed them. It should be remembered, however, that
neither the Model Act nor most of its modern counterparts accord them
even this minimal protection. 4 ' At most, though, this affords the barest
protection to creditors, and none at all to shareholders.
The equity insolvency test, standing alone, is even less adequate.
Being less objective,' 4 ' it allows greater latitude for dubious director
action.
Although stated capital need not necessarily be so pegged, it often
fixes a higher asset level than the mark set by the bankruptcy insolvency
test, and thus often provides an additional protection over the bare
minimum.'42 Therefore, as creditors deserve, and probably all legisla-
tures really intend to provide, adequate creditor protection requires the
imposition of all three limitations: no share repurchases should be made
when insolvency in either the bankruptcy or equity sense is present or
threatened, nor, except in the extraordinary circumstances outlined
above, from stated capital.
A restriction against purchases from capital, in addition to both
insolvency restrictions, is also a sine qua non of adequate senior share-
holder protection for basically the same reasons. Senior shareholders
usually have liquidation preferences. Hence they are just as legitimately
interested as creditors in having the fund on which they may draw for
satisfaction of their claims as large as possible. Unlike creditors, how-
ever, a bankruptcy insolvency test does not supply them with any real
protection. Since they are not debtors of the corporation, this test only
forbids purchases taking assets below the amount of outstanding debts,
139. An obvious example would be a corporation with a very large bond indebtedness
and no-par common stock from the consideration received for which only a nominal
amount had been allocated to stated capital, the "ideal" undercapitalized corporation.
140. See note 80 supra.
141. A corporation may, by judicious borrowing or securities flotations, postpone the
day of creditor reckoning, although it may be insolvent in the bankruptcy sense. See note
92 supra. An honest balance sheet is less easily deceived.
142. This should be true in the case of all corporations with a sound leverage ratio.
As to leverage ratio, see Guthmann & Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 102-03 (3d
ed. 1955).
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i.e., it does not guarantee that anything will remain for them after the
creditors have been paid. Only stated capital, protected against impair-
ment, will provide any safeguard. Further, as investors in the corpora-
tion with the greater risks consequent upon that status, they have a
justifiable claim not only to the protection afforded creditors through
unimpaired capital, but also in maintenance of the "profits" of the
enterprise, the corporate "surplus," in its popular connotation. Pur-
chases of junior shares, normally the only voting shares and those
catered to by management as its "electorate," diminish this protective
fund available to senior shareholders as added protection for their
liquidation rights, and also lessen the amounts available for payment of
their admittedly prior dividend claims. Consequently, their consent to
purchases of any junior shares should be required.
Moreover, even purchases of shares of their own class, if made at a
premium and selectively, divert dividend funds from the unpurchased
shareholders, and are discriminatory against them. It is, therefore,
desirable for senior shareholders that offers to repurchase their shares,
in addition to requiring approval by their own class, also necessitate pro
rata offer, as an added protection against discrimination.
Even the junior voting shares, at the bottom of the bankruptcy deck,
have the right to object to share purchases not carefully circumscribed.
Purchases of shares senior to their own from either capital or surplus
thereby diminish the fund available to them upon liquidation, and also
the amount payable to them as dividends while the business continues.
As was indicated previously, such share purchases can also disturb the
voting balance in the corporation when voting shares are concerned. The
best antidote to both corporate toxicants is approval by these voting
shareholders and pro rata offer.
The junior class of shareholders often also has an interest in not having
senior shares repurchased, even though they be redeemable. Although
their re-acquisition eliminates an added dividend drain, repurchase of
such shares at a "bonus" may lessen the dividend fund by more than
even the long-range gain possible from having fewer shares out "over"
the unpreferred. There may also be (for them) disastrous results in a
faltering corporation where the last dregs of unrestricted assets are
siphoned off to those in favor with the board of directors. Protection of
the junior class demands as well that tender offers for all classes of
shares have their approval, and be by pro rata offer, which latter mini-
mizes the possibilities of favoritism, and hence injury to them.
An added safeguard is given by the proposed insolvency restrictions,
since being the last to be "dealt a hand" on insolvency, they stand to
lose the most, often their entire equity, on such an eventuality.
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The preferable general rules are, consequently, simple and accord
with the requirements of adequate protection for all persons involved.
By imposing both the bankruptcy and equity insolvency restrictions on
all share repurchases, 143 and by limiting the general repurchases to
actually earned surplus,'" thereby preventing not only a diminution of
the asset fund below stated capital, but also circumvention of the latter
restriction through its "loopholes" (either directly, by reducing the
stated capital figure, or indirectly through retirement of repurchased
shares or write-up of asset value), the interests of creditors and share-
holders are both protected. The further limitation, that even if these
requirements are met, share purchases must be by pro rata offer (or by
lot), saves voting shareholders from vote dilution, and both voting and
nonvoting shareholders from dividend dilution.
The additional requirement that share repurchases from any class
have the approval of all classes of shareholders (two-thirds of the class
from which repurchases are to be made plus two-thirds of each of the
other classes, whether normally voting or nonvoting) follows from the
interest which senior shareholders have in preventing injury to them-
selves through purchase of junior shares, and unfair purchases from
their own class, and the interest which junior shareholders likewise have
in preventing unfair purchases from their own junior class, and from
classes senior to them.
The exceptions suggested (viz., good faith purchases from capital to
pay off dissenters and to compromise indebtedness; repurchase from
earned surplus, non-pro rata if with previous shareholder approval as
part of employee share incentive plans, or close corporation restrictive
shareholder agreements) coupled with a general grant (if similarly
authorized) to repurchase a limited number of shares without any re-
striction (except good faith) should amply accommodate any present or
prospective legitimate share repurchase needs of the third member of the
trichotomy involved, the corporation itself.
Modern corporation laws, inheriting their defects from their progenitor,
the Model Act, presently fail to give adequate protection to the interests
of shareholders and creditors and, ultimately, the best interests of the
corporation itself as a successful business vehicle. It is submitted that
the legislators enacting these statutes did not really intend to slight any
of these interests, and it is therefore hoped that they will soon correct
their errors through statutes more adequate to the problem.
143. Including, of course, the extraordinary ones from capital. Compare Nemmers,
supra note 108, at 193.
144. As is done, interestingly enough, by the grandfather of modern corporation
laws. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.6 (Smith-Hurd 1954), cited note 58 supra.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR REP RCHAsEs BY A CORPOM.aTxON OF ITS Ow"T S
A. (I) No corporation hall purchase directly or indirectly any of its shares nor shall
it agree to so repurchase, nor Shall any contract to repurchase be enforceable if at the
time of or as a result of such agreement or acquisition, or parformance of said agreement,
there is reasonable ground for believing
(1) That the corporation is or would be unable to meet its obligations as they
become due in the ordinary course of business, or
(2) That the liabilities of the corporation do or would exceed the fair present
value of its assets.
(II) Obligations incurred to any person or persons as a result of share acquisitions by
any corporation organized under this statute shall take priority over any claims asserted
by or in the right of shareholders of Said corporation, but such obligations shall, except for
evidences thereof in the form of negotiable instruments in the hands of holders in due
course and without notice, be subordinated to the rights of all other creditors of the
corporation.
B. Subject to the limitations of section A hereof, a corporation may purchase or redeem
any of its shares from earned surplus, if all of the following conditions are also fulfilled:
(1) That two-thirds of all of the shareholders of each class, whether voting or
non-voting, give their approval to said repurchases immediately prior to the making of
the offer to repurchase by said corporation.
(2) That the offer to repurchase Said shares be made pro rata to all shareholders
of the class to be repurchased or that the shareholders to whom said offer shall be made
be selected by lot, in a manner to be determined by the aforesaid vote of the aforesaid
shareholders, after full disclosure to the said shareholders of the method proposed for
making such selection.
(3) That if the shares to be repurchased are redeemable shares, no more than the
redemption price thereof be paid.
C. Notwithstanding the limitations of subsection B, but subject to the limitations of
subsection A hereof, a corporation may, if authorized by the vote, at least one year after the
filing of the articles of incorporation of said corporation, of two-thirds of the Shareholders
of record of each class, whether Said shareholders are voting or non-voting, enter into such
contracts to purchase, or make such purchases of its shares, from earned surplus, as its board
of directors may in good faith determine are desirable, provided that the sum total of the
shares of any class held and which the corporation is obligated either absolutely or con-
tingently to repurchase shall at no time exceed 55 of the outstanding shares of said class
so repurchased or contracted to be repurchased.
D. Notwithstanding the other limitations of subsections B and C hereof but subject to
the limitation of subsection A hereof, a corporation may, in good faith, and out of
earned surplus, repurchase the shares of a shareholder whose Shares it is obligated to
repurchase under a shareholders' restrictive agreement to which all of its shareholders have
assented and to which it is a party.
E. Notwithstanding the other limitations of subsections B and C hereof, but subject to
the limitations of subsection A hereof, a corporation may purchase or reacquire its shares,
from earned surplus, where it is granted the right so to do under an employee's incentive
plan where such plan has been previously approved by two-thirds of the shareholders of
each class of stoch, whether voting or non-voting.
F. Notwithstanding the limitations of subsections B or C, but subject to the limitations
of subsection A hereof, a corporation may, in good faith, and after first exhausting its
earned surplus therefor, repurchase or otherwise reacquire its shares in order to:
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(1) Compromise or collect any indebtedness due to the corporation, provided that
said reacquisition does not involve directly or indirectly the payment of or obligation to
pay any sums of money or the delivery of any property by the corporation.
(2) Pay dissenting shareholders entitled to appraisal under the provisions of this act
no more than the amount to which they are entitled under the appraisal provisions of this
act, upon satisfaction of the conditions thereof.
G. Notwithstanding any of the foregoing limitations, a corporation may, in good faith,
reacquire its shares by gift or bequest.
H. Any shares reacquired pursuant to sections B, D, F or G hereof shall, if reoffered for
sale, be first reoffered to the shareholders of the corporation in such manner as to preserve
the voting rights and proportionate financial interest in said corporation of the shareholders
of record at the time of said reoffer.
I. "Earned Surplus" as used herein shall mean the excess of the assets of the corporation
over the sum of its liabilities, stated capital, and capital surplus, however created, including
but without limitation thereto reduction surplus, surplus created by sale of par value
shares at a consideration above par, surplus created by unrealized appreciation of assets,
and allocations to surplus from the consideration received for no-par shares.
J. All directors and shareholders including former shareholders consenting to, or in
any way participating in, any share reacquisitions, or payments, distributions or cancella-
tions of obligations to the corporation as a result of such reacquisitions, whether or not
the recipients of any benefit as a result of such reacquisitions, shall be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation and its creditors in an amount equal to the value of any payment,
distribution or cancellation of obligation resulting from any share reacquisition made,
directly or indirectly, in violation of the provisions of this act.
(Special provisions with regard to investment companies might possibly also be added.
See, eg., N.C. Bus. Corp. Act § 55-52(b) (5).)
